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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, intellectual property (IP) enforcement by 
ordering Internet access providers to block infringing websites has 
been rapidly evolving in Europe. The practice is increasing since 
going after direct infringers has proven to be “heavy-handed, 
disproportionate, and ineffective,”1 whereas targeting the website 
operators is not an easy task either, as these often run their services 
from another jurisdiction,2 easily change location3 or conceal 
 
 1.  Neelie Kroes, Vice-President of the European Commission Responsible 
for the Digital Agenda from 9 February 2010 until 1 November 2014, Speech at 
the Information Influx International Conference of the Institute for Information 
Law (IViR): Our Single Market is Crying Out for Copyright Reform (Amsterdam, 
July 2, 2014). 
 2.  See, e.g., Discussion Paper: Roles and Responsibilities of Intermediaries: 
Fighting Counterfeiting and Piracy in the Supply Chain, ICC BUSINESS ACTION TO 
STOP COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY 74 (March 2015), http://www.iccwbo.org/ 
Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/BASCAP/International-engagement-and-Advocacy/ 
Roles-and-Responsibilities-of-Intermediaries/ (noting that “[o]ne of the main 
challenges is addressing both counterfeiting and piracy from websites based 
outside the jurisdiction in which the infringement takes place”) [hereinafter 
BASCAP report]. See also CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in 
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identity.4 As a result, injunctions against Internet access providers 
often remain the most efficient option left to the right-holders. 
In the European Union, the legal basis of such injunctions rests on 
Article 8(3) InfoSoc.5 According to this article, “Member States shall 
ensure that right-holders are in a position to apply for an injunction 
against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to 
infringe a copyright or related right.” An almost identical provision, 
but with regards to all intellectual property rights, is enshrined in the 
third sentence of Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive.6 In 
addition, Article 12(3) of the E-Commerce Directive7 provides that 
the so-called “mere conduit” liability exemption that would normally 
apply to Internet access providers8 “shall not affect the possibility for 
 
UPC Telekabel Wien [2013], C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781, at ¶ 23. 
 3.  Indicative in this sense is The Pirate Bay, with regards to which 
“successful court actions only led to shifting from hosting providers in one country 
to hosting providers in another country” (Arno R. Lodder & Nicole S. van der 
Meulen, Evaluation of the Role of Access Providers: Discussion of Dutch Pirate 
Bay Case Law and Introducing Principles on Directness, Effectiveness, Costs, 
Relevance, and Time, 4 JIPITEC 130 (2013), at ¶ 79). 
 4.  See CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in UPC Telekabel 
Wien [2013], C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781, at ¶ 23. The same considerations have 
informed recently the right-holders’ move towards injunctions against the ISPs of 
end users and not even those of the infringing websites. See infra parts II.2-3. 
 5.  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
May 22, 2001 On the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Information Society, L 167 O.J. 10 (2001) [hereinafter InfoSoc 
Directive]. 
 6.  Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
Apr. 29, 2004 On the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, L 195 O.J. 16 
(2004) [hereinafter Enforcement Directive]. 
 7.  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
June 8, 2000 On Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in 
Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, L 178 O.J. 1 (2000) 
[hereinafter E-Commerce Directive]. 
 8.  It has to be recalled that according to the E-Commerce Directive, “the 
[‘mere conduit’] service provider is not liable for the information transmitted, on 
condition that the provider: (a) does not initiate the transmission; (b) does not 
select the receiver of the transmission; and (c) does not select or modify the 
information contained in the transmission.” E-Commerce Directive, supra note 7, 
Art. 12. See also Recitals 42 and 43. Lodder & van der Meulen, supra note 3, at ¶ 
12 (“[a]ccess providers almost intrinsically satisfy all these conditions”) (emphasis 
added). See also Pekka Savola, Proportionality of Website Blocking: Internet 
Connectivity Providers as Copyright Enforcers, 5(2) JIPITEC 116 (2014); Martin 
Husovec, Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties: The Case of Website 
Blocking, 4 JIPITEC 116 (2013). 
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a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member 
States’ legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate 
or prevent an infringement.” Analogously, Recital 45 of the E-
Commerce Directive states the following: 
The limitations of the liability of intermediary service providers 
established in this Directive do not affect the possibility of injunctions of 
different kinds; such injunctions can in particular consist of orders by 
courts or administrative authorities requiring the termination or 
prevention of any infringement, including the removal of illegal 
information or the disabling of access to it.9 
At the same time, Article 15 of the E-Commerce prohibits the 
general monitoring obligation.10 
Even though authorized in principle by the European legislator, 
blocking injunctions have also proven problematic with regard to 
fundamental rights enshrined in the European legal order, such as the 
users’ right of access to information and the Internet service 
providers’ ability to freely conduct their business. As noted by the 
European Commission in its 2007 impact assessment, “the adoption 
of blocking measures necessarily implies a restriction of human 
rights . . . and therefore, it can only be imposed by law, subject to the 
principle of proportionality, with respect to the legitimate aims 
pursued and to their necessity in a democratic society . . . .”11 A 
 
 9.  Similarly, Recital 59 of the InfoSoc Directive provides that, “without 
prejudice to any other sanctions and remedies available, right-holders should have 
the possibility of applying for an injunction against an intermediary who carries a 
third party’s infringement of a protected work or other subject-matter in a network. 
This possibility should be available even where the acts carried out by the 
intermediary are exempted under Article 5 [exceptions and limitations].” InfoSec 
Directive, supra note 5. Further on the important distinction between liability and 
the so-called accountability of intermediaries, see Martin Husovec, Accountable, 
not Liable. How Far Should Mandatory Cooperation of Intermediaries Go?, 
http://accountablenotliable.org.  
 10.  E-Commerce Directive, supra note 7. According to Art. 15(1) thereof, 
“Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when 
providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14 [‘mere conduit’, 
‘caching’, and hosting], to monitor the information which they transmit or store, 
nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal 
activity.” 
 11.  European Commission, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a 
Council Framework Decision Amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on 
Combating Terrorism: Impact Assessment ¶ 4.2 (Council of Europe 
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uniform approach towards achieving proportionality in website 
blocking is, however, currently lacking in Europe. Inasmuch as the 
InfoSoc Directive left “[t]he conditions and modalities relating to 
such injunctions . . . to the national law of the Member States,”12 
blocking practices vary significantly across Europe. This generates 
further discrepancies in the case law, “leav[ing] much to be desired 
in terms of human rights”13 and overall level of harmonization.14 
As a response to this situation of legal uncertainty, two major 
European courts – the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) – have 
recently provided some guidance on the fundamental-rights 
balancing in cases of website blocking on the grounds of copyright 
infringement.15 The point of departure has been two landmark 
decisions of these courts, which thus need to be briefly presented: the  
 
 
Commissioner, Working Paper, No. 14960/07, 2007) (emphasis added). 
 12.  Recital 59 of the InfoSoc Directive, supra note 5. See also Recital 23 of 
the Enforcement Directive, supra note 6. 
 13.  Douwe Korff & Ian Brown, Social Media and Human Rights (Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Discussion Paper, 2012), 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1904319. 
 14.  European Commission, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe – 
Analysis and Evidence 30 (Council of Europe Commissioner, Working Paper, 
2015) (admitting “where local legislation implementing Article 8(3) of the 
Directive 2001/29/EC provides instruments for obtaining injunctive measures 
against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a 
copyright or related right, certain aspects of the conditions and procedures relating 
to these injunctions remain fragmented” (emphasis added)); see also Richard 
Arnold, Website-Blocking Injunctions: The Question of Legislative Basis, 37(10) 
EIPR 623, 626 (2015) (observing that “[t]he proportionality of website-blocking 
injunctions remains highly controversial”). 
 15.  On the increasing influence of human and fundamental rights on the 
resolution of IP disputes, see Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual 
Property Law?, The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in 
Europe, 37(4) INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 371 (2006); 
Fundamental Rights as Common Principles of European (and International) 
Intellectual Property Law, in COMMON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 223 (Ansgar Ohly ed., 2012); Reconceptualizing the 
Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 115 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 3rd ed., 2015); Implementing 
Intellectual Property Provisions in Human Rights Instruments: Towards a New 
Social Contract for the Protection of Intangibles, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 661 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015). 
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so-called UPC Telekabel judgment of the CJEU and the Akdeniz v. 
Turkey decision of the ECtHR. 
UPC Telekabel 
The case before the CJEU, UPC Telekabel,16 involved a major 
Austrian Internet access provider that was ordered, at the request of 
two film production companies, to block access of its customers to 
the website kino.to, offering the films of the companies for streaming 
or download without the right-holders’ consent. The order was made 
in the form of the so-called “outcome prohibition”17 – a standard 
injunction under the Austrian procedural law that obliged its 
addressee to prevent a particular outcome (access to the website in 
this case) from occurring, without however specifying the means. 
UPC Telekabel appealed, considering that such an injunction could 
not be addressed to it, given that it did not have any business 
relationship with the operators of the website and it was not 
established that its own customers acted unlawfully. The Internet 
service provider (ISP) also claimed that the various possible blocking 
measures that could be introduced might, in any event, all be 
technically circumvented and that some of those were excessively 
costly. The question was therefore raised before the CJEU on 
whether it was compatible with Union law, and in particular with the 
necessary balance between the parties’ fundamental rights, to ask an 
Internet access provider in quite general terms to hinder its 
customers’ access to an infringing website, without specifying the 
measures which that access provider had to take.18 
In a judgment rendered in March 2014, the CJEU held that such an 
injunction was legitimate in principle,19 as it was indispensable “to 
guarantee right-holders a high level of protection” envisaged as an 
objective of the InfoSoc.20 The blocking made it necessary, however, 
to reconcile the following conflicting rights: i) copyright and related 
 
 16.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192. 
 17.  CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in UPC Telekabel 
Wien [2013], C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781, at ¶¶ 16 and 60. 
 18.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 42. 
 19.  Id. at ¶ 64. 
 20.  Id. at ¶ 31 (referring to Recital 9 of the InfoSoc Directive) (emphasis 
added). 
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rights (protected under Article 17(2) of the EU Charter); ii) an 
Internet access provider’s freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 
of the EU Charter); and iii) the freedom of information of Internet 
users (Article 11 of the EU Charter).21 The Court observed in 
particular with regard to the Internet users’ right to information that 
there would be no infringement of this right, if the blocking was 
“strictly targeted” and if the users were accorded an opportunity to 
assert their rights before the national court once the implementing 
measures taken by the ISP were known.22 As concerns the ISP’s 
freedom to conduct a business, there was no violation of this right 
either, as an outcome prohibition23 left the ISP to choose which 
blocking technique better adapted to its resources to implement.24 
Furthermore, the fact that the Austrian outcome prohibition allowed 
the ISP to avoid liability by showing that it had taken all reasonable 
measures25 had, according to the Court, the effect that “unbearable 
sacrifices” would not be required from the access provider.26 Finally, 
with regard to the right to intellectual property protected under 
Article 17(2) of the EU Charter, the Court observed that the blocking 
had to be “sufficiently effective to ensure genuine protection of the 
fundamental right at issue.”27 In practical terms, this meant that even 
the possibility of circumvention did not preclude the blocking that 
only had to be “reasonable”28 in discouraging users from accessing 
infringing content.29 
Akdeniz v. Turkey 
Interestingly, just a few days before the Telekabel judgment was 
rendered, another supranational court in Europe – the ECtHR (also 
 
 21.  Id. at ¶ 47. 
 22.  Id. at ¶¶ 56-57. 
 23.  I.e. a generic order, as contrasted to specific injunctions. 
 24.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 52. 
 25.  The background to this element lied in the particular national rules for the 
issuing and enforcement of an injunction at issue. See generally CJEU, Judgment 
in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 10; and CJEU, 
Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in UPC Telekabel Wien [2013], C-
314/12, EU:C:2013:781, at ¶¶ 60-61, 67-69. 
 26.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 27 March 
2014, EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 53. 
 27.  Id. at ¶ 62. 
 28.  Id. at ¶ 59. 
 29.  Id. at ¶ 62. 
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“the Strasbourg Court”) – likewise had to decide on the issue of 
website blocking and its effects on human rights. The case before the 
Strasbourg Court, Akdeniz,30 concerned the blocking of access in 
Turkey, at the request of the Professional Union of Phonogram 
Producers, to the websites myspace.com and last.fm on the grounds 
that they were disseminating musical works in violation of copyright. 
The applicant, who had applied to the ECtHR as a regular user of the 
websites in question, complained about the collateral effects of 
blocking: according to him, the blocking amounted to a 
disproportionate response in the light of Article 10 (freedom of 
expression and information) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).31 The only issue raised before the Strasbourg Court 
thus concerned the freedom of information of the Internet users, as 
neither the websites in question nor their ISPs contested the 
blocking. It has to be noted further that no provision analogous to 
that of the EU Charter’s freedom to conduct a business is envisaged 
in the ECHR, which largely remains an instrument for the protection 
of the so-called first-generation rights (civil and political32). 
Unlike the CJEU, that recognized the users’ standing in analogous 
suits, the ECtHR declared the application inadmissible ratione 
 
 30.  ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 20877/10), 
CE:ECHR:2014:0311DEC002087710. 
 31.  The applicant also complained under Art. 6 of the Convention that the 
measure blocking websites violated his right to a fair trial and the principle of the 
presumption of innocence. According to him, in the absence of adversarial 
procedure, the provisional measure had seriously impeded on his freedom of 
expression. He added that several procedural flaws, including the opposition period 
and the obligation to state reasons, have aggravated this measure (ECtHR, Akdeniz 
v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 20877/10), CE:ECHR:2014:0311DEC002087710, at ¶ 12). 
The ECtHR decided, however, regard being had to the close correlation between 
the applicant’s claims under Arts. 6 (fair trial) and 10 (freedom of expression) of 
the Convention, that the applicant’s lack of standing for the purposes of Art. 10 of 
the Convention  equally applied in respect of the Art. 6 complaint (ECtHR, 
Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 20877/10), CE:ECHR:2014:0311DEC002087710, 
at ¶ 29). 
 32.  Further on different “generations” of human rights, see Christian 
Tomuschat, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 25 et seq. (2nd 
ed., 2008). On the nature of rights guaranteed by the ECHR in particular, see 
David J. Harris et al., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 3 
et seq. (2nd ed., 2009). On the hierarchy of human rights, see Peggy 
Ducoulombier, Interaction Between Human Rights: Are All Human Rights Equal?, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 39, 
supra note 15. 
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personae.33 The Court noted that the applicant, along with the other 
Turkish users of the two music-sharing websites, was only indirectly 
affected by the blocking. According to the ECtHR, this was not 
sufficient to consider the applicant a victim for the purposes of the 
Convention.34 The Court further observed that the websites were 
blocked because they did not comply with copyright legislation and 
that the applicant had only been deprived of one means of listening 
to music among many (legitimate) others.35 Furthermore, it was not 
alleged by the applicant that the websites at issue distributed 
information of a specific interest for him or that the blocking 
deprived him of an importance source of communication.36 The 
Court also differentiated this case from its earlier finding of Article 
10 violation in Yildirim, in which the applicant, as an owner and user 
of his own website, complained of impossibility to access it as a 
result of a blocking measure that affected an entire Google module.37 
By contrast, Mr. Akdeniz acted as a “mere” user of the two websites 
devoted to the dissemination of music.38 In addition, neither the 
collateral effects of blocking, nor the commercial nature of the 
websites concerned, were considered by the Court to raise an 
important question of general interest.39 Finally, the need to balance 
freedom of information against the right to property of copyright 
holders, which is also protected by the Convention, left the national 
authorities with a particularly wide margin of appreciation in 
regulating the dispute.40 
As the above cases demonstrate, European courts advance several 
factors to inform – from the perspective of different fundamental 
rights – the website blocking practices for copyright enforcement in 
Europe.41 This article examines these factors in detail, starting with 
 
 33.  ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 20877/10), 
CE:ECHR:2014:0311DEC002087710, at ¶ 29. 
 34.  Id. at ¶ 24. 
 35.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
 36.  Id. at ¶ 26. 
 37.  ECtHR, Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey (No. 3111/10), CE:ECHR:2012:1218 
JUD000311110. 
 38.  ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 20877/10), CE:ECHR:2014:0311 
DEC002087710, at ¶ 27 (emphasis added). 
 39.  Id. at ¶ 28. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  This paper’s focus is on substantive fundamental rights. The procedural 
(due process) guarantees are also discussed, but only to the extent they affect 
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the freedom of expression framework for website blocking and the 
rather revolutionary for European judiciary concept of user rights 
that has being construed under it.42 It then proceeds to discuss the 
limits of intermediaries’ involvement in digital enforcement dictated 
by the EU-specific freedom to conduct a business. Factors resulting 
from the human right to property framework for IP, including the 
required level of efficacy of its enforcement, merit a separate 
examination. By means of conclusion, the final part of this article 
identifies the standards for online copyright enforcement online, 
reflecting further on alternatives to the currently prioritized 
enforcement strategies. 
II. A FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION PERSPECTIVE 
ON WEBSITE BLOCKING: THE EMERGENCE OF 
USER RIGHTS 
The right to freedom of expression, as protected by Article 10 
ECHR and Article 11 EU Charter, benefits from a privileged position 
in the European constitutional order43 and is sometimes even called 
the “European First Amendment.”44 In the course of recent years, this 
 
substantive rights that are at the center here. For a substantial discussion of the fair 
trial aspects of enforcement, see Jonathan Griffiths, Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights and the Right to a Fair Trial, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 438, supra note 15; Kimberlee 
Weatherall, Safeguards for Defendant Rights and Interests in International 
Intellectual Property Enforcement Treaties, AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 211 (2016). 
 42.  On the other side of the Atlantic, analogous liberal stance was taken earlier 
by the Supreme Court of Canada, which since its groundbreaking Théberge and 
CCH decisions (Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 SCR 
336; CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 SCR 339) was 
increasingly emphasising “a move away from an earlier, author-centric view” 
towards “promoting the public interest” and the “users’ rights [as] an essential part 
of furthering the public interest objectives of the Copyright Act” (SOCAN v. Bell 
Canada, [2012] 2 SCR 326, at ¶¶ 9-11; see also Alberta (Minister of Education) v. 
Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), [2012] 2 SCR 345). 
 43.  ECtHR, Handyside v. United Kingdom (No. 5493/72), 
CE:ECHR:1976:1207JUD000549372, at ¶ 49 (establishing that “freedom of 
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [a democratic] society, 
one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every 
man”). 
 44.  Dirk Voorhoof, Het Europese ‘First Amendment’: de vrijheid van 
expressie en informatie en de rechtspraak van het EHRM betreffende art. 10 
EVRM (1994-1995), MEDIAFORUM (AMSTERDAM) 11 (1995); Christophe Geiger, 
DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DROIT DU PUBLIC A L’INFORMATION, APPROCHE DE DROIT 
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right, which guarantees not only the right to impart information but 
also the right of the public to receive it,45 has evolved towards 
inclusion of a genuine “right to Internet access.”46 In a June 2009 
decision on the first HADOPI law,47 the French Constitutional 
Council, for instance, explicitly stated that “[i]n the current state of 
the means of communication and given the generalized development 
of public online communication services and the importance of the 
latter for the participation in democracy and the expression of ideas 
and opinions, [the right to freedom of expression] implies freedom to 
access such services.”48 Since then, this national reading has found 
further support in the July 2012 UN Human Rights Council 
Resolution on protection of freedom of expression on the Internet.49 
Prior to that, the right to Internet access was only implicitly 
considered by the UN as a human right, insofar as it is inherent in the 
“freedom . . . to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
 
COMPARE 166 (2004). 
 45.  See, e.g., ECtHR, Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (Nos. 1 
and 2) (Nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03), CE:ECHR:2009:0310JUD000300203, at ¶ 
27; ECtHR, Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey (No. 3111/10), CE:ECHR:2012:1218 
JUD000311110, at ¶ 50; ECtHR, Guseva v. Bulgaria (No. 6987/07), CE:ECHR: 
2015:0217JUD000698707, at ¶ 36; ECtHR, Cengiz and Others v. Turkey (Nos. 
48226/10 and 14027/11), CE:ECHR:2015:1201JUD004822610, at ¶ 56. On the 
public’s right to receive information, see also Christophe Geiger, Author’s Right, 
Copyright and the Public’s Right to Information: A Complex Relationship, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 24 (Fiona Macmillan ed., vol. 5, 2007). 
 46.  See on this question, Pierre-François Docquir, Internet, les raisons d’un 
droit d’accès, in LE TÉLÉCHARGEMENT D’ŒUVRES SUR INTERNET: PERSPECTIVES EN 
DROITS BELGE, FRANÇAIS, EUROPÉEN ET INTERNATIONAL 349 (Carine Doutrelepont 
et al. eds., 2012); Nicola Lucchi, Access to Network Services and Protection of 
Constitutional Rights: Recognizing the Essential Role of Internet Access for the 
Freedom of Expression, 19(3) CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 645 (2011); Molly 
Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54(2) HARV. INT’L L.J. 393 
(2013). 
 47.  For a comprehensive discussion on the HADOPI law, see Christophe 
Geiger, Honourable Attempt But (Ultimately) Disproportionately Offensive 
Against Peer-to-Peer on the Internet (HADOPI) – A Critical Analysis of the Recent 
Anti-File-Sharing Legislation in France, 42(4) INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 457 (2011); Counterfeiting and the Music Industry: Towards a 
Criminalization of End Users? The French “HADOPI” Example, in CRIMINAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
RESEARCH 386 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2012). 
 48.  Conseil constitutionnel [Constitutional Council], decision No. 2009-580 
DC, June 10, 2009, at ¶ 12 (emphasis added). 
 49.  G.A. Res. 20/8, (July 16, 2012); see also G.A. Res. 26/L.24, (June 20, 
2014). 
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through any media and regardless of frontiers.”50 In Europe, a 
survey conducted by the ECtHR of the legislation of twenty Member 
States of the Council of Europe revealed: 
[T]he right to Internet access is protected in theory by the constitutional 
guarantees applicable to freedom of expression and freedom to receive 
ideas and information. The right to Internet access is considered to be 
inherent in the right to access information and communication protected 
by national Constitutions, and encompasses the right for each individual 
to participate in the information society and the obligation for States to 
guarantee access to the Internet for their citizens. It can therefore be 
inferred from all the general guarantees protecting freedom of expression 
that a right to unhindered Internet access should also be recognized.51 
Accordingly, any measure that is bound to have an influence on 
the accessibility of the Internet engages the responsibility of the State 
under Article 10 ECHR.52 Within the framework of this Article (to 
which Article 11 of the EU Charter corresponds53), the court deciding 
in website blocking cases will have to look, primarily, at the manner 
of the site usage (1) and the effects of blocking on legitimate 
communication (2), but also at the public interest in disabled 
information (3) and whether the alternatives to accessing such 
information were available (4). Under certain circumstances, it will 
further be pertinent to consider the Article 10 implications for not 
only Internet users, but also the intermediaries concerned (5). 
 
 50.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948), Art. 19 (freedom of expression) (emphasis added). 
 51.  ECtHR, Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey (No. 3111/10), CE:ECHR:2012:1218 
JUD000311110, at ¶ 31. 
 52.  Id. at ¶ 53. See also, on the level of the EU, Commission Staff Working 
Document 531/2012, O.J. 3-4 (Sept. 11, 2013) at ¶ 3.4 (“Any limitations to access 
to the Open Internet can impact on end-users’ freedom of expression and the way 
in which they can receive and impart information. Although operators need to 
manage Internet traffic in order to ensure the proper functioning of the networks 
(including managing network congestion, security threats, etc.), there are many 
instances when unjustified blocking and throttling occurs.” (emphasis added)). 
 53.  The scope of Art. 11 EU Charter is the same as that of Art. 10 ECHR as 
per Art. 52(3) of the EU Charter. See also Note from the Praesidium, Draft 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Text of the Explanations 
Relating to the Complete Text of the Charter as set out in CHARTE 4487/00 
CONVENT 50 (Brussels, 2000), Explanations on Art. 11 of the EU Charter, at 13-
14. 
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A. USER RIGHTS: BUT WHICH USERS? 
One prominent consequence of the free speech review of website 
blocking in copyright infringement cases rests in the idea of user 
rights as enforceable rights of equal value (and not mere interests 
to be taken into account54). In Telekabel, the CJEU explicitly 
recognized the cause of action for those ISP’s customers whose 
information rights might be affected by website blocking. It held in 
particular that, “in order to prevent the fundamental rights recognized 
by EU law from precluding the adoption of an injunction such as that 
at issue in the main proceedings, the national procedural rules must 
provide a possibility for internet users to assert their rights before the 
court once the implementing measures taken by the internet service 
provider are known.”55 
 
 54.  This contrasts the traditional doctrinal approach, in which users only have 
interests while right-holders have rights. Favouring the granting of positive rights 
to users. See, e.g., Robert Burrell & Allison Coleman, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: 
THE DIGITAL IMPACT 279 et seq. (2005); Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, User’s 
Rights, Reconstructing Copyright Policy on Utilitarian Grounds, 29(1) EIPR 1 
(2007); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright in a Digital Ecosystem: A User-Rights 
Approach, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS (Ruth 
L. Okediji ed., forthcoming 2016); Christophe Geiger, Copyright and Free Access 
to Information: For a Fair Balance of Interests in a Globalised World, 28(7) EIPR 
366, 371 et seq. (2006); Copyright as an Access Right: Securing Cultural 
Participation Through the Protection of Creators’ Interests, in WHAT IF WE 
COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? (Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee G. Weatherall eds., 
forthcoming 2016). On the emergence of user’s rights in the case law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union, see Christophe Geiger, The Role of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union: Harmonizing, Creating and Sometimes Disrupting 
Copyright Law in the European Union, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EU AND 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 435 (Irini A. Stamatoudi ed., 2016). 
 55.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 57 (emphasis added). It is submitted that such cause of action 
may be provided to the users on the basis of their contractual relationship with the 
intermediary implementing an injunction (Martin Husovec, CJEU Allowed Website 
Blocking Injunctions with Some Reservations, 9(8) JIPLP 631, 633 (2014)). This 
assumption was in effect further supported by the implementing decision of the 
Austrian Court that was of the opinion that “[the locus standi] requirement is 
already fulfilled in the Austrian law because the customers can sue their provider 
on the contractual basis in case they consider the blocking measures not lawful or 
excessive. Because the contract between the access provider and his consumers is 
to be, as a rule, interpreted meaning that all – but only those – website blocking 
injunctions are permitted, which correspond to requirements of the CJEU. Already 
this possibility suffices to guarantee the right of the customers to legal access to 
information, which was stressed by the CJEU. In order to reduce the risk of 
conflicting decisions, the provider will be in such a case able to announce the 
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Thereby obliging the national authorities to avail the users of the 
procedural opportunity to challenge the blocking before the courts,56 
the CJEU advanced the idea that freedom of expression may be 
invoked not as a mere defense, but as a right on which an action in 
the main case is based.57 Although the CJEU envisaged this 
possibility within quite a limited context of result-tailored 
injunctions, some commentators have considered that such 
procedural standing or locus standi of users would “also apply[] to 
national courts issuing specific orders, unless proportionality has 
also been reviewed from the users’ perspective.”58 
A similar logic was developed in a number of other cases on the 
so-called “exceptions” to copyright which the CJEU started to frame 
as “rights.” In Painer, for example, the Court stated that the 
quotation exception enshrined in Article 5(3)(d) InfoSoc intended to 
strike a fair balance between the rights of users of protected subject-
matter and the reproduction right conferred on authors.59 According 
to the Court, striking the balance in this case implied to favour “the 
exercise of the users’ right to freedom of expression over the interest 
 
dispute to the right holder, who gave rise to such blocking” (Oberster Gerichtshof 
[Austrian Supreme Court], UPC-Telekabel II/kino.to, No. 4Ob71/14s, June 24, 
2014, translation from German by Martin Husovec in Austrian Supreme Court 
Confirms Open-Ended Website Blocking Injunctions [UPC Telekabel Wien], 
HUŤKO´S TECHNOLOGY LAW BLOG (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.husovec.eu/ 
2014/08/austrian-supreme-court-confirms-open.html). 
 56.  Notably, this procedural guarantee is consonant with one of the principal 
positions of the Office of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
on that “[b]locking must be carried out with effective notice on the conclusion of 
due process, and interested parties should be given the opportunity to challenge 
the decision in public judicial proceedings.” See Korff & Brown, supra note 13 
(emphasis added). 
 57.  See in this regard Uma Suthersanen, Copyright as an Engine of Free 
Speech: An English Perspective, in COPYRIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALAI STUDY DAYS 167, 184 (2008) (observing that 
“[c]ourts need to grasp that when a defendant pleads ‘freedom of expression’, it is 
not a defence but a counter-claim”). 
 58.  Savola, supra note 8, at ¶ 36 (emphasis added). See also Husovec, CJEU 
Allowed Website Blocking Injunctions with Some Reservations, supra note 55, at 
633 (“[E]ven the implementation of technology-specific and fixed website-
blocking injunctions can lead to a problem of overblocking of the legitimate 
content, which might also have been a reason why the CJEU especially requires 
the need of locus standi for users. This would then lead to locus standi of users as a 
general requirement also in cases of all the specific website-blocking injunctions”). 
 59.  CJEU, Judgment in Painer [2011], C-145/10, EU:C:2011:798, at ¶ 134. 
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of the author in being able to prevent the reproduction of extracts 
from his work which has already been lawfully made available to the 
public.”60 Furthermore, in Ulmer, the CJEU ruled that the Member 
States were free to authorize the publicly accessible libraries to 
digitize, without the right-holders’ consent, the works contained in 
their collections if that was necessary in order to make those works 
available on dedicated terminals. According to the Court, “[s]uch a 
right of communication of works [for the purpose of research and 
private study61] . . . would risk being rendered largely meaningless, 
or indeed ineffective, if those establishments did not have an 
ancillary right to digitize the works in question”62 recognized 
pursuant to Article 5(2)(c) InfoSoc.63 Analogously, in Deckmyn, the 
parody “exception” was likewise framed by the CJEU in a “rights-
language,” from which it followed that the application of such 
exception had to strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, the 
interests and rights of copyright holders, and, on the other, the rights 
of users of protected subject-matter to freedom of expression.64 
Finally, the Charter Article 11 and the ECHR Article 10 rights of 
users have also featured in a number of the national courts’ rulings.65 
 
 60.  Id. at ¶ 135 (emphasis added). 
 61.  Exception under Art. 5(3)(n) of the InfoSoc Directive, supra note 5. 
 62.  CJEU, Judgment in Ulmer [2014], C-117/13, EU:C:2014:2196, at ¶ 43 
(emphasis added). 
 63.  Id. at ¶ 44 (emphasis added). 
 64.  CJEU, Judgment in Deckmyn [2014], C-201/13, EU:C:2014:2132, at ¶ 27. 
See the European Copyright Society, Limitations and Exceptions as Key Elements 
of the Legal Framework for Copyright in the European Union – Opinion of the 
European Copyright Society on the Judgment of the CJEU in Case C-201/13 
Deckmyn, 46(1) INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 93 (2015); Jonathan 
Griffiths et al., The European Copyright Society’s “Opinion on the Judgment of 
the CJEU in Case C-201/13 Deckmyn,” 37(3) EIPR 127 (2015). 
 65.  See, e.g., in the UK: Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v. British 
Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), at ¶¶ 164 and 199; EMI 
Records Ltd & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2013] EWHC 379 
(Ch), at ¶¶ 94 and 107; Cartier International AG & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting 
Ltd & Ors [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), at ¶¶ 193 and 196; and Cartier International 
Ltd & Anor v. British Telecommunications Plc & Ors [2016] EWHC 339 (Ch), at 
¶ 49. In Denmark: Sø- og Handelsretten [Maritime and Commercial Court in 
Copenhagen], Fritz Hansen A/S and Others v. Telia Danmark, No. A-38-14, Dec. 
11, 2014, transcript from the record of judgments, at 10. In Germany: 
Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court of Justice], I ZR 3/14, Nov. 
26, 2015, DE:BGH:2015:261115UIZR3.14.0, at ¶ 44; Bundesgerichtshof [German 
Federal Supreme Court of Justice], I ZR 174/14, Nov. 26, 2015, 
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As it concerns the ECtHR, its stance on user rights in copyright 
disputes is, however, less clear. Although in a number of website 
blocking cases the Court ruled positively on the victim status of the 
applicant-users, none of those concerned copyright.66 Moreover, 
unlike the CJEU, the Strasbourg Court distinguishes between 
“active” users involved in not only receiving, but also imparting 
information on the Internet, and the so-called “mere” or “simple” 
users67 acting as the passive recipients thereof. As explained recently 
in Cengiz and Others, the answer to the question whether an 
applicant can claim to be a victim of a measure blocking access to 
the website would depend in particular on the manner in which the 
website is used.68 In that case, which concerned the blocking of 
access to the website YouTube, the Court recognized the victim 
status of the applicants who used this platform for not only accessing 
the videos of their interest but also actively, by downloading and 
sharing files from their YouTube accounts.69 Analogously, in the case 
of Yildirim mentioned above, locus standi was granted to the owner 
of the website blocked in the context of judicial proceedings 
unrelated to the applicant’s site. By contrast, in the only copyright 
case on website blocking decided by the Strasbourg Court so far, the 
ECtHR found the applicant to lack standing because, among others, 
the use concerned was qualified as passive.70 
On the substance, however, the approaches of the CJEU and the 
ECtHR to the rights of users might not be that different. The decision 
on the victim status was linked by the ECtHR to the assessment on 
the merits – an approach that essentially boils down to the 
 
DE:BGH:2015:261115UIZR174.14.0, at ¶ 53. In France: Tribunal de Grande 
Instance de Paris [High Court of Paris], 3rd chamber, SCPP v. Orange, Free, SFR 
et Bouygues Télécom, No. 14/03236, Dec. 4, 2014, at 7. In Greece: District Court 
of Athens, No. 13478/2014, Dec. 22, 2014. 
 66.  See ECtHR, Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey (No. 3111/10), CE:ECHR:2012: 
1218JUD000311110; and ECtHR, Cengiz and Others v. Turkey (Nos. 48226/10 
and 14027/11), CE:ECHR:2015:1201JUD004822610. 
 67.  ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 20877/10), CE:ECHR:2014:0311 
DEC002087710, at ¶ 27; ECtHR, Cengiz and Others v. Turkey (Nos. 48226/10 and 
14027/11), CE:ECHR:2015:1201JUD004822610, at ¶ 50 (emphasis added). 
 68.  ECtHR, Cengiz and Others v. Turkey (Nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11), CE: 
ECHR:2015:1201JUD004822610, at ¶ 49. 
 69.  Id. at ¶ 50. 
 70.  ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 20877/10), CE:ECHR:2014:0311 
DEC002087710, at ¶ 27. 
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proportionality review akin to that of the CJEU when it weighs the 
right to property of copyright holders against the freedom of 
information of the users.71 Consequently, the ECtHR did not rule out 
the possibility of users being accorded standing (and ultimately even 
prevailing) in copyright suits with another factual background.72 An 
outcome of such cases would depend on a number of factors, but 
primarily – on the effects of blocking on legitimate content. 
B. COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF BLOCKING 
Collateral effects of blocking constitute, alongside the manner of 
the site usage, an important factor to be accounted for under the 
freedom of expression framework. This is all the more so, since, as a 
report of the Independent regulator and competition authority for the 
UK communications industries (Ofcom) has emphasized, each 
blocking measure also carries a risk of “overblocking.”73 
 
 71.  See generally, comparing the approaches of the ECtHR and CJEU to 
balancing copyright and freedom of expression, Alain Strowel, Pondération entre 
liberté d’expression et droit d’auteur sur internet: de la réserve des juges de 
Strasbourg à une concordance pratique par les juges de Luxembourg, 100 REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 889 (2014); Bernd Justin Jütte, The 
Beginning of a (Happy?) Relationship: Copyright and Freedom of Expression in 
Europe, 38(1) EIPR 11 (2016); Elena Izyumenko, The Freedom of Expression 
Contours of Copyright in the Digital Era: A European Perspective, 19 J. OF 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. 115 (2016). 
 72.  It might have been preferable, however (if only for the sake of ensuring 
consistency in the application of fundamental rights by both European courts), if 
Art. 10 complaint in Akdeniz had been rejected on other grounds linked to 
admissibility and not on the basis of the applicant’s victim status. In particular, the 
proportionality analysis conducted by the ECtHR in Akdeniz suggests that the case 
should have been rather rejected as manifestly ill-founded (notably, due to a clear 
absence of a lack of proportionality between the aim and the means). All the more 
so in view of the ECtHR’s consistent emphasis that Art. 10 guarantees not only the 
right to impart information but also the right of the public to receive it. See, e.g., 
ECtHR, Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (Nos. 1 and 2) (Nos. 
3002/03 and 23676/03), CE:ECHR:2009:0310JUD000300203, at ¶ 27; ECtHR, 
Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey (No. 3111/10), CE:ECHR:2012:1218JUD000311110, at 
¶ 50; ECtHR, Guseva v. Bulgaria (No. 6987/07), CE:ECHR:2015:0217JUD 
000698707, at ¶ 36; ECtHR, Cengiz and Others v. Turkey (Nos. 48226/10 and 
14027/11), CE:ECHR:2015:1201JUD004822610, at ¶ 56. On the important 
differences between the admissibility criteria related to the ECtHR’s jurisdiction 
and those based on the merits, see Council of Europe/European Court of Human 
Rights, PRACTICAL GUIDE ON ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIA (3rd ed., 2014). 
 73.  Ofcom, “Site Blocking” to Reduce Online Copyright Infringement: A 
Review of Sections 17 and 18 of the Digital Economy Act 1, 6 (May 27, 2010), 
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Consequently, as the CJEU stressed it in Telekabel, the blocking 
should be “strictly targeted,”74 meaning that “the measures adopted 
by the internet service provider . . . must serve to bring an end to a 
third party’s infringement of copyright or of a related right but 
without thereby affecting internet users who are using the provider’s 
services in order to lawfully access information.”75 The CJEU 
thereby confirmed the principle first set down by the ECtHR in 
Yildirim and further reiterated in Akdeniz. In accordance with this 
principle, “any measure blocking access to a website [has] to be part 
of a particularly strict legal framework ensuring both tight control 
over the scope of the ban and effective judicial review to prevent 
possible abuse, because it [can] have significant effects of ‘collateral 
censorship’.”76 On the international level, the General Comment No. 
34 on freedom of expression analogously states that any permissible 
restrictions on the operation of websites or any systems to support 
information dissemination, including Internet service providers, are 
only permissible to the extent that they are content-specific.77 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that any collateral 
“overblocking” of legitimate content precludes an injunction. In the 
 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-blocking.pdf; see also 
Cormac Callanan et al., Internet Blocking: Balancing Cybercrime Responses in 
Democratic Societies 1, 26 (Open Society Institute, 2009), http://www.aconite. 
com/sites/default/files/Internet_blocking_and_Democracy.pdf. 
 74.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 56. 
 75.  Id. (emphasis added). See also, more recently, CJEU, Judgment in Mc 
Fadden [2016], C-484/14, EU:C:2016:689, at ¶ 93. 
 76.  ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 20877/10), 
CE:ECHR:2014:0311DEC002087710, at ¶ 28, citing ECtHR, Ahmet Yildirim v. 
Turkey (No. 3111/10), CE:ECHR:2012:1218JUD000311110, at ¶¶ 64-66 
(translation from French draws on the Legal Summary of the case prepared by the 
Registry of the ECtHR (Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 173, April 
2014)). See also the Dissenting opinion of judge Pinto de Albuquerque in ECtHR, 
Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland [GC] (No. 16354/06), 
CE:ECHR:2012:0713JUD001635406 (“[U]sers must not be subjected to any 
licensing or other requirements having a similar effect, nor any general blocking or 
filtering measures by public authorities, or restrictions that go further than those 
applied to other means of content delivery. When exceptional circumstances 
justify the blocking of unlawful content, it is necessary to avoid targeting users 
who are not part of the group for whose protection a filter has been activated” 
(emphasis added). 
 77.  UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34. Article 19: 
Freedoms of Opinion and Expression (Sept. 12, 2011), CCPR/C/GC/34, at ¶ 43. 
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majority of cases, it would suffice that a substantial proportion of the 
website is infringing, despite certain bits of legitimate content also 
being affected. It is for this reason that the blocking of Newzbin2, for 
example, was found justified in the UK case of 20C Fox v. BT,78 
even on admittance that that measure potentially prevented non-
infringing uses.79 On the evidence, however, the incidence of such 
uses was de minimis, whereas it was clear that the copyright holders’ 
rights were infringed on a massive scale.80 In the same vein, it was 
recently held by the German Federal Supreme Court of Justice 
(Bundesgerichtshof) that “the block . . . cannot only be accepted if 
solely unlawful information is made available on the website.”81 
According to this court, it is “necessary, in the course of the 
balancing exercise, to look not at an absolute amount of legitimate 
content on the respective site, but at the overall ratio of lawful and 
unlawful content and whether the former constitutes a non-
significant amount in comparison with the latter.”82 In Denmark, the 
blocking of an online shop Interior Addict (on which infringing 
replica products were sold) was allowed for similar reasons.83 As 
stated by the Maritime and Commercial Court in Copenhagen, the 
blocking was proportionate, since “the products infringing on the 
 
 78.  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v. British Telecommunications 
Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch). 
 79.  Id. at ¶ 186. 
 80.  Id. at ¶¶ 185-186. Similar reasoning was applied to website blocking in 
trademark cases. In Cartier II, for example, the blocking was allowed even on 
admittance that it was liable to affect the sale of lawfully marketed goods on the 
target websites. In that case, the blocking was allowed on consideration that “the 
claimants have done their best to warn the operators and the operators have chosen 
to continue to put the Target Websites at risk by marketing counterfeit products on 
them” (Cartier International Ltd & Anor v. British Telecommunications Plc & Ors 
[2016] EWHC 339 (Ch), at ¶ 67). 
 81.  Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court of Justice], I ZR 3/14, 
Nov. 26, 2015, supra note 65, at ¶ 44, translation from German by the authors. See 
also, to the same effect, Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court of 
Justice], I ZR 174/14, Nov. 26, 2015, supra note 65, at ¶ 55. 
 82.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 83.  Sø- og Handelsretten [Maritime and Commercial Court in Copenhagen], 
Fritz Hansen A/S and Others v. Telia Danmark, No. A-38-14, Dec. 11, 2014, 
transcript from the record of judgments, supra note 65. See generally Maria 
Fredenslund, Danish Court Issues Website Blocking Ruling Concerning the Illegal 
Distribution of Replica Products, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Jan. 23, 2015), 
http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2015/01/23/danish-court-issues-website-blocking-
ruling-concerning-the-illegal-distribution-of-replica-products/. 
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Plaintiffs’ rights represent[ed] a significant part of the range of 
products offered at www.interioraddict.co.uk.”84 It thus followed that 
the Internet users were not “unfairly prevent[ed] from accessing 
information to which they [were] legally entitled.”85 In Norway, 
likewise, the blocking of seven file-sharing sites, an amount of 
esteemed infringing content on which varied from 75 to 100 per cent, 
was authorized by the Oslo District Court on September 2015.86 
The decision by the District Court of Athens from late 2014 stands 
out from this general pattern. In that case, the Court rejected an 
injunction ordering, at the request of five Greek collecting societies, 
the blocking of a number of file-sharing websites, The Pirate Bay 
being among them.87 According to the Court, the blocking was 
disproportionate with regard to the users’ freedom of information, 
because some of the content offered on the websites concerned could 
be legal, such as the works that lacked originality, have already 
fallen into the public domain, or those whose communication to the 
public was authorized by the authors through, for example, creative 
commons licenses.88 In the Court’s reasoning, only the blocking of 
specific (infringing) parts of the website could have been justified, 
 
 84.  Sø- og Handelsretten [Maritime and Commercial Court in Copenhagen], 
Fritz Hansen A/S and Others v. Telia Danmark, supra note 83, at 10 (emphasis 
added). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Oslo Tingrett [Oslo District Court], Warner Bros. Entertainment Norge AS 
and Others v. Telenor Norge AS and Others, No. 15-067093TVI-OTIR/05, Sept. 1, 
2015, http://www.dagbladet.no/f/15067093tviotirkjennelse.pdf. For a comment, 
see Josef Ohlsson Collentine, Norway Blocks the Pirate Bay and Other Sites, 
PIRATE TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://piratetimes.net/norway-blocks-the-pirate-bay-
and-other-sites/. 
 87.  District Court of Athens, No. 13478/2014, Dec. 22, 2014, supra note 65. 
See also Yannos Paramythiotis, Website Blocking in Greece: How Does it Work 
There?, IPKAT (Jan. 28, 2015), http://ipkitten.blogspot.fr/2015/01/website-
blocking-in-greece-how-does-it.html; Ernesto Van der Sar, Torrent Site Blockades 
are Disproportional, Greek Court Rules, TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 21, 2015), 
https://torrentfreak.com/torrent-site-blockades-are-disproportional-greek-court-
rules-150121/; Tatiana Sinodinou, Draft Law Provision on the Administrative 
Removal and Blocking of Online Copyright Infringing Content. Will 2016 Bring 




 88.  See Paramythiotis, supra note 87; Sinodinou, supra note 87. 
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leaving legitimate content intact.89 
While the proportion of permissible overblocks might remain 
unclear in some cases, any instances of a so-called “blanket 
blocking” would most certainly fall short of the Article 10 ECHR (or 
Article 11 EU Charter) requirements. In the ECtHR case of Yildirim, 
for example, the blocking of the entire Google Sites to target only 
one offending website within that group was considered to create 
arbitrary effects running contrary to Article 10 ECHR.90 Similarly, a 
violation of the right to receive and impart information was 
established in the case of Cengiz and Others v. Turkey that concerned 
a wholesale blocking of YouTube on the sole basis that the contents 
of ten video files available on this site were found to be infringing.91 
The collateral blocking considerations have also informed the 
CJEU’s findings in two Telekabel predecessors – the Sabam cases. In 
Scarlet Extended, an injunction requiring an Internet access provider 
to install a system for filtering all electronic communications passing 
via its services with an aim to prevent any online activity liable to 
infringe copyright was outlawed by the Court as not being capable to 
distinguish adequately between unlawful and lawful content, with the 
result that its introduction could have led to blocking of lawful 
communications.92 In SABAM v. Netlog, analogous conclusion was 
reached with regards to an owner of an online social networking 
platform.93 As noted by the CJEU in those cases, “the reply to the 
question whether a transmission is lawful also depends on the 
application of statutory exceptions to copyright which vary from one 
Member State to another. In addition, in some Member States certain 
works fall within the public domain or may be posted online free of 
charge by the authors concerned.”94 
 
 89.  See Paramythiotis, supra note 87. 
 90.  ECtHR, Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey (No. 3111/10), CE:ECHR:2012:1218 
JUD000311110, at ¶¶ 66 and 68. 
 91.  ECtHR, Cengiz and Others v. Turkey (Nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11), CE: 
ECHR:2015:1201JUD004822610. 
 92.  CJEU, Judgment in SABAM v. Netlog [2012], C-360/10, EU:C:2012:85, 
at ¶ 50. 
 93.  CJEU, Judgment in Scarlet Extended [2011], C-70/10, EU:C:2011:771, at 
¶ 52. 
 94.  CJEU, Judgment in SABAM v. Netlog [2012], C-360/10, EU:C:2012:85, 
at ¶ 50; and, by analogy, CJEU, Judgment in Scarlet Extended [2011], C-70/10, 
EU:C:2011:771, at ¶ 52. In the sphere of trademark protection, it was likewise 
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On the national level, in some cases it was considered appropriate 
to adopt a more targeted form of order, where the blocking of a 
website with substantial legitimate content was at stake.95 Thus, in 
Italy, the Court of Appeals of Rome overturned an order requiring 
local ISPs to block access to the video streaming platform 
Filmakerz.org in its entirety, on consideration that the order was too 
broad.96 According to the Court, the partial blocking of specific 
URLs was to be preferred in that case over the blocking of an entire 
site.97 
Apart from the proportion of legitimate content on each individual 
website, the “collateral censorship” issues might also arise out of the 
specific technique of blocking.98 This is the case in particular with 
the Internet Protocol (IP) address blocking.99 Since multiple websites 
habitually share a common IP address, blocking of one of those 
 
stated that, although “[o]bviously freedom of expression and information does not 
permit the infringement of intellectual property rights . . . , it entails that the 
protection of trade mark proprietor’s rights in the context of electronic commerce 
may not take forms that would infringe the rights of innocent users of an electronic 
marketplace” (CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in L’Oréal v. eBay 
[2010], C-324/09, EU:C:2010:757, at ¶ 158). 
 95.  Savola, supra note 8, at ¶ 72. 
 96.  Ernesto Van der Sar, Court Orders ISPs to Unblock “Pirate” Site, 
TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 3, 2014), https://torrentfreak.com/court-orders-isps-to-
unblock-pirate-site-140403/. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  There are three main forms of blocking commonly applied by the ISPs: the 
Internet Protocol (IP) address blocking; the Domain Name System (DNS) 
blocking; and the Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technique (the latter being a form 
of the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) blocking). In a lot of cases, a combination 
of blocking measures was applied. On the technical background on website 
blocking, see Ofcom, supra note 73; Callanan et al., supra note 73, at 90 et seq. 
See also, for a condensed summary, Lukas Feiler, Website Blocking Injunctions 
Under EU and U.S. Copyright Law – Slow Death of the Global Internet or 
Emergence of the Rule of National Copyright Law?, Transatlantic Technology 
Law Forum (TTLF) Working Paper No. 13, 2012, at 6-11; Cartier International 
AG & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), at ¶ 
25. 
 99.  IP addresses are the most basic addresses that numerically identify 
computers connected to the Internet (e.g., 120.39.214.983). They are often 
compared in this sense to telephone numbers. IP address blocking disables users’ 
communications destined for the IP address of the website concerned (Callanan et 
al., supra note 73, at 92; Ofcom, supra note 73, at 3 and 28; Cartier International 
AG & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), at ¶ 
25). 
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would automatically lead to overblocking of all of its “neighbors” 
that ought not to be blocked.100 As noted by Justice Arnold in the UK 
case of Dramatico v. Sky (No 2), “IP address blocking is generally 
only appropriate where the relevant website’s IP address is not 
shared with anyone else. If it is shared, the result is likely to be 
overblocking”101 In that case, however, the website’s address was not 
shared, hence the IP address blocking was found appropriate.102 To 
the contrary, the Antwerp Court of Appeals expressly dismissed IP 
address blocking back in 2011 based on a strong likelihood of 
collateral effects on the websites sharing the same IP address with 
The Pirate Bay.103 
Significantly, “[o]nly the hosting provider will know how many 
sites share a particular IP address,”104 which raises additional 
concerns with regards to possible arbitrariness associated with this 
type of blocking.105 For example, in the UK case of FAPL v. Sky, in 
which the orders at stake required IP address blocking, the right-
holder’s evidence was that the IP address of infringing website was 
not shared.106 In reality, though, this turned out not to be the case, 
with a result that the “Internet users were denied access to UK 
television listings website radiotimes.com, as well as hundreds of 
other websites.”107 
 
 100.  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation & Ors v. British 
Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch), at ¶ 6; Ofcom, supra note 73, 
at 30. 
 101.  Dramatico Entertainment Ltd & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & 
Ors [2012] EWHC 1152 (Ch), at ¶ 13, with further references to Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corporation & Ors v. British Telecommunications Plc [2011] 
EWHC 2714 (Ch), at ¶ 6. 
 102.  Dramatico Entertainment Ltd & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & 
Ors [2012] EWHC 1152 (Ch), at ¶ 13. 
 103.  Hof van Beroep, Antwerpen [Antwerp Court of Appeals], VZW Belgian 
Anti-Piracy Federation v. NV Telenet, No. 2011/8314, Sept. 26, 2011, 
http://nurpa.be/files/20111004_BAF-Belgacom-Telenet-DNS-blocking.pdf, at 14, 
cited in Feiler, supra note 98, at 23-24; Savola, supra note 8, at note 130. 
 104.  Ofcom, supra note 73, at 30. 
 105.  See Feiler, supra note 98, at 9-10. 
 106.  The Football Association Premier League Ltd v. British Sky Broadcasting 
Ltd & Ors [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch), discussed in Savola, supra note 8, at ¶ 50. 
 107.  Premier League Piracy Fight Brings Down Radio Times Site, WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. REV. (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.worldipreview.com/news/ 
premier-league-piracy-fight-brings-down-radio-times-site. However, the accuracy 
of the right-holders’ analysis regarding the sharing of IP addresses continued being 
accepted by the UK courts, although with a caveat that, “[i]f the ISPs consider that 
GEIGER; THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT ONLINE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2016  3:03 PM 
66 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [32:1 
Finally, as convincingly put by Pekka Savola, “[w]hile 
overblocking has not yet caused significant problems with the top 
infringing sites, the ever-expanding blocking implies that this would 
become a problem. Specifically, for example, proxy sites and less 
significant websites will most likely almost always use a shared IP 
address.”108 
Insofar as the Domain Name System (DNS) blocks are 
concerned,109 those often target, as the Ofcom report explains, the so-
called “uppermost level of the infringing domain.”110 Consequently, 
if lawful services happen to operate within the same domain zone as 
infringing ones, overblocks are inevitable.111 An Ofcom illustration is 
the blocking order against the domain name “example.com” that 
blocks both “guilty.example.com” and “innocent.example.com.”112 In 
Ofcom’s proposition, it might therefore be necessary that the court 
“consider[s] the relative amounts of infringing and lawful content 
within the relevant domain and reach[es] a view on whether the 
amount of infringing content within the domain zone was sufficient 
to justify blocking access to all sites within the zone.”113 
The Uniform Resource Locator (URL) blocking114 is generally 
 
the position is open to doubt, they are entitled to require the Court to decide the 
question.” See Cartier International AG & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & 
Ors [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), at ¶¶ 254-257; see also Cartier International Ltd & 
Anor v. British Telecommunications Plc & Ors [2016] EWHC 339 (Ch), at ¶¶ 68-
70. 
 108.  Savola, supra note 8, at ¶ 87. 
 109.  Domain names are unique names that identify Internet resources (e.g., 
website.example.eu) and are much easier for the users to remember compared to 
numerical and lengthy IP addresses. In this sense, domain names resemble actual 
persons’ names in a telephone book (Domain Name System, DNS), to which 
particular telephone numbers (IP addresses) correspond. DNS blocking thus 
implies altering the ISP-operated DNS server that allows translating a domain 
name into the corresponding IP address that computers need to communicate 
(Ofcom, supra note 73, at 3, 31-32; Feiler, supra note 98, at 7; Callanan et al., 
supra note 73, at 92-93). 
 110. In the domain hierarchy, the top-level domains are represented by 
extensions such as “.com,” “.eu,” “.edu,” etc. See Ofcom, supra note 73, at 34. 
 111.  Id. at 34. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  URL consists of a domain name together with further information 
identifying specific content on the Internet (e.g., http://www.domainname.eu/ 
specific/pirate/content.zip). See Callanan et al., supra note 73, at 93; Ofcom, supra 
note 73, at 3, 35-36. 
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considered to be more precise. One of its forms, the so-called Deep 
Packet Inspection (DPI)115 is “the only one to combine a highly 
granular approach with being able to catch all forms of unencrypted 
traffic.”116 It suffers from other problems though, high costs and 
complexity coupled with intrusiveness into the users’ private sphere 
being among them.117 
C.  VALUE OF CONTENT: THE GENERAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN 
INFORMATION 
The next factor which needs to be taken into account in the 
balancing process from a freedom of expression perspective is the 
general public interest in information affected by the blocking 
measure. Unlike the CJEU, which did not pay much tribute to this 
criterion in Telekabel, the ECtHR provided some guidance on its 
potential implications for copyright enforcement. 
As pointed out by the Strasbourg Court in Akdeniz, “the applicant 
had not alleged that the websites in question disseminated 
information which could present a specific interest for him or that the 
blocking of access had had the effect of depriving him of a major 
source of communication.”118 Accordingly, “the fact that the 
applicant had been deprived of access to those websites had not 
prevented him from taking part in a debate on a matter of general 
interest.”119 The ECtHR further recalled its established case law, in 
accordance with which: 
[W]hile Article 10 § 2 of the Convention does not allow much leeway for 
restrictions of freedom of expression in political matters, for example, 
States have a broad margin of appreciation in the regulation of speech in 
commercial matters . . . , bearing in mind that the breadth of that margin 
has to be qualified where it is not strictly speaking the “commercial” 
 
 115.  DPI-based URL blocking examines network traffic with an aim to block 
specific URLs identified as infringing (Ofcom, supra note 73, at 3, 39-40; Cartier 
International AG & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2014] EWHC 
3354 (Ch), at ¶ 25). 
 116.  Ofcom, supra note 73, at 40. 
 117.  Id. at 40-41; Callanan et al., supra note 73, at 116.  
 118.  ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 20877/10), CE:ECHR:2014:0311 
DEC002087710, at ¶ 26 (emphasis added), translation from French on the basis of 
the Legal Summary of the case prepared by the Registry of the ECtHR, supra note 
76. 
 119.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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expression of an individual that is at stake but his participation in a debate 
on a matter of general interest.120 
The Court referred to its earlier findings in Ashby Donald – the 
case that concerned the conviction in France of the three fashion 
photographers for copyright infringement by taking the photos of 
designers’ clothes and publishing them online without the consent of 
the right-holders. There, likewise, it was noted that, “although one 
cannot deny that the public is interested in fashion in general and 
haute couture fashion shows in particular, it could not be said that 
the applicants took part in a debate of general interest when 
restricting themselves to making photographs of fashion shows 
accessible to the public.”121 In the light of that case law, the Court 
was not convinced that the case of Akdeniz raised an important 
question of general interest.122 
The ECtHR thus seemed to imply that in other cases with greater 
public interest in information the blocking might not be justified in 
terms of Article 10 ECHR. 
Although it is well-known that the ECtHR tends to attach the 
highest value to political speech,123 it is also notable that the general 
public interest in information is not reduced to political context. In 
effect, such interest had previously been recognized by the Court in 
 
 120.  Id. at ¶ 28 (with further references). 
 121.  ECtHR, Ashby Donald and Others v. France (No. 36769/08), 
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908, at ¶ 39, translation from French published in 
the 45(3) INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 354 (2014). See also 
Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human Rights’ Trial: 
Redefining the Boundaries of Exclusivity Through Freedom of Expression, 45(3) 
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 316 (2014). 
 122.  ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 20877/10), CE:ECHR:2014:0311 
DEC002087710, at ¶ 28. 
 123.  See, e.g., ECtHR, Castells v. Spain (No. 11798/85), CE:ECHR:1992:0423 
JUD001179885, at ¶ 42; ECtHR, Piermont v. France (Nos. 15773/89 and 
15774/89), CE:ECHR:1995:0427JUD001577389, at ¶ 76; ECtHR, Rekvényi v. 
Hungary [GC] (No. 25390/94), CE:ECHR:1999:0520JUD002539094, at ¶ 26; 
ECtHR, Ceylan v. Turkey [GC] (No. 23556/94), CE:ECHR:1999:0708 
JUD002355694, at ¶ 34. See also ECtHR, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque in Fáber v. Hungary (No. 40721/08), CE:ECHR:2012:0724 
JUD004072108 (“[O]bjectively and subjectively political nature of the expression 
is irrefutable, which significantly narrows the margin of appreciation of the 
respondent State.”). 
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the information on, e.g. sporting matters124 or performing artists,125 as 
well as when the material at issue related to the moral position 
advocated by an influential religious community.126 The standards of 
scrutiny would also typically be more stringent for artistic, cultural 
or otherwise “civil” expression.127 
An interesting example to look at in the context of copyright 
website blocking is the websites that allow to stream coverage of 
sporting events. The latest line of cases on broadcasting rights from 
the CJEU is indicative in this regard. 
Sky Österreich128 revolved around the provision of the Audiovisual 
Directive129 (notably, Article 15(6) thereof), limiting to technical 
costs the amount of compensation which holders of exclusive 
broadcasting rights may seek from other broadcasters for short news 
reports on events of high interest to the public, such as football 
matches. Legitimacy of this provision was contested by Sky which 
held exclusive broadcasting rights in Europa League matches in the 
2009-2010 to 2011-2012 seasons in Austrian territory and for which 
it claimed having spent millions of Euros each year on the license 
and production costs. In its January 2013 judgment, the CJEU held 
that the contested provision of the Directive was justified in the light 
of freedom to receive information, which outweighed the freedom to 
conduct a business of a holder of exclusive broadcasting rights.130 
 
 124.  See, e.g., ECtHR, Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria 
(No. 5266/03), CE:ECHR:2007:0222JUD000526603, at ¶ 25 (society’s attitude 
towards a sports star); ECtHR, Colaço Mestre and SIC – Sociedade Independente 
de Comunicação, S.A. v. Portugal (Nos. 11182/03 and 11319/03), CE:ECHR: 
2007:0426JUD001118203, at ¶ 28 (an interview by the president of the sports 
club); and ECtHR, Ressiot and Others v. France (Nos. 15054/07 and 15066/07), 
CE:ECHR:2012:0628JUD001505407, at ¶ 116 (doping practices in professional 
sport). 
 125.  See ECtHR, Sapan v. Turkey (No. 44102/04), CE:ECHR:2010:0608JUD 
004410204, at ¶ 34 (a book about the Turkish pop star). 
 126.  ECtHR, Verlagsgruppe News GmbH and Bobi v. Austria (No. 59631/09), 
CE:ECHR:2012:1204JUD005963109, at ¶ 76. 
 127.  Harris et al., supra note 32, at 457 et seq. 
 128.  CJEU, Judgment in Sky Österreich [2013], C-283/11, EU:C:2013:28. 
 129.  Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
March 10, 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of 
audiovisual media services, L 95 O.J. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Audiovisual Directive]. 
 130.  CJEU, Judgment in Sky Österreich [2013], C-283/11, EU:C:2013:28, at ¶ 
66. 
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The Court noted in particular the following: 
[T]he marketing on an exclusive basis of events of high interest to the 
public is increasing and liable to restrict considerably the access of the 
general public to information relating to those events. It is in that 
connection that Article 15 of Directive 2010/13 seeks . . . to safeguard the 
fundamental freedom to receive information, guaranteed under Article 
11(1) of the Charter, and to promote pluralism of the media in the 
production and programming of information in the European Union, 
protected under Article 11(2) of the Charter.131 
The Court went on to say: “[S]afeguarding of the freedoms 
protected under Article 11 of the Charter undoubtedly constitutes a 
legitimate aim in the general interest . . . , the importance of which in 
a democratic and pluralistic society must be stressed in 
particular . . . . That importance is particularly evident in the case of 
events of high interest to the public.”132 It thus followed that Article 
15 of Audiovisual Directive did pursue an objective in the general 
interest. 
A similar logic accompanied the Luxemburg Court’s findings in 
the cases of UEFA and FIFA v. Commission that followed later the 
same year.133 There, the CJEU considered that the prohibition on 
exclusive broadcasting of all the matches in the final stages of the 
World Cup and EURO was justified by the objective of protecting 
the right to information and ensuring wide public access to television 
coverage of those events. Notably, in the Member States concerned 
(the UK and Belgium) those events were designated, on the basis of 
the Directive concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting 
activities,134 as events of major importance for society. Having 
 
 131.  Id. at ¶ 51. 
 132.  Id. at ¶ 52 (emphasis added). 
 133.  CJEU, Judgment in UEFA v. Commission [2013], C-201/11 P, 
EU:C:2013:519; CJEU, Judgment in FIFA v. Commission [2013], C-204/11 P, 
EU:C:2013:477; and CJEU, Judgment in FIFA v. Commission [2013], C-205/11 P, 
EU:C:2013:478. 
 134.  Council Directive 89/552/EEC of Oct. 3, 1989 on the coordination of 
certain provisions laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in 
Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities, L 298 
O.J. 23 (1989), as amended by Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of June 30, 1997, L 202 O.J. 60 (1997). Art. 3a(1) of Directive 
89/552/EEC authorizes the Member States to draw up the national lists in order to 
ensure that certain events that they regard as being of major importance for society 
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stressed a particular importance of the right to receive information in 
the case of the tournaments at issue, the Court of Justice considered 
that this right was to be given priority over exclusive broadcasting. It 
observed in particular that restrictions on the right-holders’ rights to 
freedom to provide services, freedom of establishment, freedom of 
competition and the right to property were expressly authorized by 
the Union legislature who also found them to be proportionate. The 
Court also noted that the Member States were accorded a broad 
discretion in designating the events of major importance, which was 
not proved to be excessive in the light of the actual perception of the 
UK and Belgian public and the evidence provided by FIFA and 
UEFA to the Court. 
On the national level, however, in the case which expressly 
concerned blocking access to the website that indexed the user-
generated streams of television broadcasts of sporting events (FAPL 
v. Sky), the value-of-information factor was not even considered by 
the UK court.135 Essentially, Justice Arnold was satisfied that the 
blocking was proportionate for the reasons advanced by the claimant 
(FAPL in that case)136 and that “[t]he interests of [the latter] and the 
supporting right-holders in enforcing their copyrights clearly 
outweigh[ed] the Article 11 EU Charter rights of the users of the 
Websites, who [could] obtain the copyright works from lawful 
sources.”137 
All in all, it is hardly imaginable that in a case with strong freedom 
of expression interests (which might not have been the case of Ashby 
Donald, Akdeniz, or FAPL v. Sky), the proprietary interests of 
copyright holders would prevail.138 In Cengiz, for instance, the 
 
are excluded from exclusive broadcasting so that such events can be available on 
free television. 
 135.  The Football Association Premier League Ltd v. British Sky Broadcasting 
Ltd & Ors [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch). 
 136.  Id. at ¶ 55. 
 137.  Id. at ¶ 59. 
 138.  Contra Constitutional Court of South Africa, Laugh It Off Promotions CC 
v. South African Breweries International (Finance) B.V. t/a Sabmark International, 
May 27, 2005, CCT 42/04; 36 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 868 
(2005); Court of The Hague, Nadia Plesner v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, May 4, 
2011, No. KG ZA 11-294. In both of those cases, the freedom of expression 
interests prevailed over the right-holders’ property, on consideration of the strong 
political (or rather society-critical) message of the expression at issue. 
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blocking was found disproportionate in terms of Article 10 ECHR on 
consideration (inter alia) of the fact that “YouTube broadcast[ed] not 
only artistic and musical works, but [was] also a very popular 
platform for political discourse and political and social activities. 
Files disseminated by YouTube includ[ed] amongst other 
information that could be of particular interest for everyone . . . .”139 
Accordingly, “the contested measure [made] inaccessible a site with 
information of specific interest for the applicants that [was] not 
easily accessible by other means. This site [was] also an important 
source of communication for the applicants.”140 
D. ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ACCESSING THE INFORMATION 
Another, although perhaps less obvious factor that might become 
important in shaping the width of digital copyright enforcement is 
the availability of alternative means of accessing the information. In 
Cengiz, in particular, a violation of Article 10 ECHR was established 
where the blocking rendered inaccessible a website with information 
of specific interest that was not otherwise easily available and for 
which there was no equivalent.141 Analogously, by noting in Akdeniz 
that many alternative (legal) means of access to music were available 
to the applicant,142 the Strasbourg Court left open the possibility of 
refusing the blocking injunction in a situation of a lack of (more and 
better?) legitimate offerings. 
As was highlighted in the Ofcom report, “the relative 
attractiveness of legal alternatives” impacts “[t]he extent to which 
consumers and site operators will seek to circumvent blocking.”143 
Accordingly, it has to “form[] part of a broader package of measures 
to tackle infringement.”144 The issue of costs might also get involved, 
 
 139.  ECtHR, Cengiz and Others v. Turkey (Nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11), CE: 
ECHR:2015:1201JUD004822610, at ¶ 51, translation from French by the authors. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. at ¶¶ 51-52. 
 142.  ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 20877/10), 
CE:ECHR:2014:0311DEC002087710, at ¶ 25. 
 143.  Ofcom, supra note 73; Callanan et al., supra note 73, at 6. 
 144.  Id. See also Brett Danaher et al., The Effect of Piracy Website Blocking on 
Consumer Behavior 26 (November 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2612063 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2612063 (suggesting that “antipiracy enforcement is 
more effective when consumers have access to (and are more aware of) attractive 
legal alternatives”). 
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since it has often been underlined, albeit in relation to developing 
countries, that counterfeiting and piracy need to be viewed from the 
consumption side as well.145 In this regard, Gene Hoffman, the CEO 
of Emusic, Inc. has, for example, conceded that “the best way to stop 
piracy is to make music so cheap it isn’t worth copying.”146 
Viewed in this light, the alternative-means factor is capable of 
remedying the current “lack of structural incentives for improving 
access”147 by partially shifting the onus on the right-holders. The 
latter have often preferred in the past deterrence models of 
enforcement to the introduction of more attractive alternatives in the 
marketplace. In this line, Fred von Lohmann, a Senior Copyright 
Counsel at Google, has argued recently that in the context of Article 
8(3) InfoSoc proceedings there is only an accuser demanding 
reasonable measures from a defendant, whereas the most effective 
measure might be something that the accuser himself is capable of 
bringing in the marketplace.148 Indeed, while “the court in the context 
of Article 8(3) lacks the ability to weigh all the interests and 
improvise a complete set of remedies,”149 the emphasis on freedom 
of information, rights of users, and – more specifically – on the 
“alternative means” factor, opens the way to a broader perspective. 
E. NOT ONLY THE USER RIGHTS: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION  
OF THE ISPS 
Apart from the rights conferred on users, some courts have also 
recognized that website blocking engages the freedom of expression 
rights of the ISPs. 
As noted by the Advocate General (AG) in his Opinion on 
 
 145.  See Joe Karaganis (ed.), MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES i 
(2011). 
 146.  Committee on Intellectual Property Rights and the Emerging Information 
Infrastructure, National Research Council, The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual 
Property in the Information Age 80 (2000), cited in Peter K. Yu, The Copyright 
Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 435 (2003).  
 147.  Rebecca Giblin, When ISPs Become Copyright Police, 18(2) IEEE 
INTERNET COMPUTING 84, 85 (2014). 
 148.  Fred von Lohmann, Senior Copyright Counsel, Google, Speech at the 
Information Influx International Conference of the Institute for Information Law 
(IViR): Filtering Away Infringement: Copyright, Injunctions and the Role of ISPs 
(Amsterdam, July 3, 2014). 
 149.  Id. 
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Telekabel, “[a]lthough it is true that, in substance, the expressions of 
opinion and information in question are those of the ISP’s customers, 
the ISP can nevertheless rely on that fundamental right by virtue of 
its function of publishing its customers’ expressions of opinion and 
providing them with information.”150 In other words, an ISP can “rely 
on the social importance of its activity” of making Internet access 
available.151 In support of this contention, AG referred to an 
established body of the ECtHR case law, in accordance with which 
“Article 10 guarantees freedom of expression to ‘everyone’, [with] 
[n]o distinction [being] made in it according to the nature of the aim 
pursued or the role played by natural or legal persons in the exercise 
of that freedom.”152 According to the ECtHR, although “publishers 
do not necessarily associate themselves with the opinions expressed 
in the works they publish, . . . by providing authors with a medium 
they participate in the exercise of the freedom of expression . . . .”153 
Indeed, the human right to freedom of expression claims of the 
ISPs are not as such unusual in the practice of the ECtHR. More 
recently, the Article 10 rights of an ISP have even made their way to 
the Grand Chamber in a case of Delfi AS that concerned the liability 
of Estonia’s largest Internet portal for hosting infringing content 
generated by its users, despite the fact that the portal had no actual 
knowledge of infringing content which it, moreover, removed 
immediately upon notification by the injured person’s lawyers.154 On 
the facts, however, no violation of Article 10 was established – a 
finding that has since then been widely criticized for imposing on 
Internet intermediaries an excessively high standard of liability.155 
 
 150.  CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in UPC Telekabel 
Wien [2013], C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781, at ¶ 82. 
 151.  Id. at ¶ 108. 
 152.  ECtHR, Öztürk v. Turkey [GC] (No. 22479/93), CE:ECHR:1999:0928 
JUD002247993, at ¶ 49, referred to by the Advocate General Cruz Villalón in his 
Opinion on UPC Telekabel Wien [2013], C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781, at ¶ 82. 
 153.  ECtHR, Öztürk v. Turkey [GC] (No. 22479/93), CE:ECHR:1999:0928 
JUD002247993, at ¶ 49. 
 154.  ECtHR, Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC] (No. 64569/09), CE:ECHR:2015:0616 
JUD006456909. 
 155.  69 media organisations, Internet companies, human rights groups and 
academic institutions that sided with an ISP failed to influence the Grand 
Chamber’s ruling. See Open Letter addressed to the President of the European 
Court of Human Rights Dean Spielmann (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www. 
laquadrature.net/en/civil-society-calls-on-the-echrs-grand-chamber-to-overturn-
GEIGER; THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT ONLINE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2016  3:03 PM 
2016] HUMAN RIGHTS IN COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 75 
Nevertheless, in a recent judgment on a similar issue the Court found 
that holding an ISP liable for user comments indeed violates that 
ISP’s freedom of expression.156 
On the national level, it was highlighted in a series of UK cases 
that, apart from the freedom of expression rights of users, the 
freedom of expression rights of the ISPs and website operators are 
also affected by website blocking.157 Nevertheless, those were clearly 
outweighed in these particular cases by the property rights of the 
Studios and other copyright owners.158 
At the end, in the Telekabel case, the Court made no mention of 
 
delfi-v-estonia-ruling). See also Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Sajó and 
Tsotsoria in Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, CE:ECHR:2015:0616 
JUD006456909; Lorna Woods, Delfi v Estonia: Curtailing Online Freedom of 
Expression?, EU LAW ANALYSIS (June 18, 2015), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.fr/ 
2015/06/delfi-v-estonia-curtailing-online.html; Eileen Weinert, Delfi AS v Estonia: 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights Hands Down its 
Judgment: Website Liable for User-Generated Comments, 26 ENT. L. REV. 246 
(2015); Dirk Voorhoof, Delfi AS v. Estonia: Grand Chamber Confirms Liability of 
Online News Portal for Offensive Comments Posted by its Readers, STRASBOURG 
OBSERVERS (June 18, 2015), http://strasbourgobservers. com/2015/06/18/delfi-as-
v-estonia-grand-chamber-confirms-liability-of-online-news-portal-for-offensive-
comments-posted-by-its-readers/. 
 156.  ECtHR, Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. 
Hungary (No. 22947/13), CE:ECHR:2016:0202JUD002294713. An ISP at issue 
was the owner of one of the major Internet news portals in Hungary. The second 
applicant, in respect of which a violation of Art. 10 (freedom of expression) ECHR 
has likewise been established, was the self-regulatory body of Hungarian Internet 
content providers. It is worth, however, noting that – unlike in the case of Delfi – 
the comments at stake in MTE were not qualified by the Court as clearly unlawful 
hate speech. In addition, the Court had regard to the fact that one of the applicants 
in MTE, again in contrast to Delfi, was a non-profit organisation which did not 
operate for economic purpose. For a comment on the MTE case, see Lorna Woods, 
Freedom of Expression and Liability for Internet Comments: A Key New ECHR 
Judgment, EU LAW ANALYSIS (Feb. 21, 2016), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot. 
fr/2016/02/freedom-of-expression-and-liability-for.html; Christina Angelopoulos, 
MTE v Hungary: New ECtHR Judgment on Intermediary Liability and Freedom of 
Expression, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (March 5, 2016), 
http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2016/03/05/mte-v-hungary-new-ecthr-judgment-
on-intermediary-liability-and-freedom-of-expression/. 
 157.  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v. British Telecommunications 
Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), at ¶ 200; EMI Records Ltd & Ors v. British Sky 
Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), at ¶ 94. 
 158.  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v. British Telecommunications 
Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), at ¶ 200; EMI Records Ltd & Ors v. British Sky 
Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch), at ¶ 107. 
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the freedom of expression rights of those other than users. However, 
this could also mean that the CJEU considered, in the circumstances 
of the case, those interests minor enough not to merit a separate 
examination. 
III. A FREEDOM TO CONDUCT A BUSINESS 
PERSPECTIVE ON WEBSITE BLOCKING: THE 
(RISING) ROLE OF THE ISPS IN DIGITAL 
COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 
Apart from freedom of expression, another fundamental right that 
comes to balancing in copyright website blocking cases is the 
freedom of access providers to conduct their business as per Article 
16 of the EU Charter. In contrast to freedom of expression, which is 
a right with a long constitutional tradition, the freedom to conduct a 
business is a quite peculiar fundamental right. As such, it is not 
known to any other international human rights instrument but the EU 
Charter. The Charter, having acquired a binding status rather 
recently,159 makes the freedom to conduct a business also a relatively 
young right.160 As a consequence, “to date the case law has not . . . 
provided a full and useful definition of this freedom.”161 Both the 
textual context and the judicial history of Article 16, however, point 
to its much-qualified nature, allowing the State a wide power to 
interfere with it.162 This particularly “weak” substance of the right163 
 
 159.  The EU Charter became binding with the entrance into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon on December 2009. See Art. 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) as amended by Art. 1(8) of the Treaty of Lisbon (European Union, Treaty 
of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, C 306 O.J. 1 (2007)). 
 160.  However, some national constitutions have provided for the protection of 
the freedom to conduct a business long before these supranational developments. 
See, e.g., Art. 41 of the Italian Constitution of 1947; Art. 38 of the Spanish 
Constitution of 1978; Art. 49 of the Croatian Constitution of 1990; and Art. 74 of 
the Slovenian Constitution of 1991. 
 161.  CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Alemo-Herron and 
Others [2013], C-426/11, EU:C:2013:82, at ¶ 49. 
 162.  As made clear by the CJEU, “[o]n the basis of . . . case law and in the light 
of the wording of Article 16 of the Charter, which differs from the wording of the 
other fundamental freedoms laid down in Title II thereof [Freedoms], yet is similar 
to that of certain provisions of Title IV of the Charter [Solidarity], the freedom to 
conduct a business may be subject to a broad range of interventions on the part of 
public authorities which may limit the exercise of economic activity in the public 
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has arguably allowed the CJEU in Telekabel to rule in favour of 
right-holders, and establish a “fair balance” where the Advocate 
General failed to find one.164 It also influenced the proportionality 
evaluation of enforcement, including such balancing factors as: the 
costs and complexity of blocking (1), subsidiarity of injuncting 
access providers (2), links of injunctions to liability (3), and 
justifiability of the shift of enforcement burdens on intermediaries 
(4). 
A.  COSTS AND COMPLEXITY OF BLOCKING 
As noted in Telekabel, “[t]he freedom to conduct a business 
includes, inter alia, the right for any business to be able to freely use, 
within the limits of its liability for its own acts, the economic, 
technical and financial resources available to it.”165 This is consonant 
with Article 3(1) of the Enforcement Directive that requires that “the 
measures, procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the 
enforcement of the intellectual property rights . . . [are not] 
unnecessarily complicated or costly.” 
The costs and complexity of blocking made one of the focal points 
of proportionality assessment in Telekabel. There, it was admitted 
that the outcome prohibition “constrains its addressee in a manner 
which restricts the free use of the resources at his disposal because it 
obliges him to take measures which may represent a significant cost 
 
interest” (CJEU, Judgment in Sky Österreich [2013], C-283/11, EU:C:2013:28, at 
¶ 46; CJEU, Judgment in Schwerdt v. OHIM - Iberamigo (cat&clean) [2015], T-
587/13, EU:T:2015:37, at ¶ 55). 
 163.  Further on the scope and relatively “weak” nature of the freedom to 
conduct a business under the EU Charter, see Xavier Groussot et al., Weak Right, 
Strong Court – The Freedom to Conduct Business and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
(Sionaidh Douglas-Scott & Nicholas Hatzis eds., forthcoming 2016). See also 
Tuomas Mylly, The Constitutionalization of the European Legal Order: Impact of 
Human Rights on Intellectual Property in the EU, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 103, 116, supra note 15 (noting 
that the freedom to conduct a business is among “the weakest” rights as “it can be 
limited more easily than most other freedoms”); Deutsches Weintor [2012], C-
544/10, EU:C:2012:526, at ¶ 54). 
 164.  CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in UPC Telekabel 
Wien [2013], C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781, at ¶¶ 85-86. 
 165.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 49. 
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for him, have a considerable impact on the organization of his 
activities or require difficult and complex technical solutions.”166 
These constraints did not, nevertheless, in the Court’s reasoning, 
“seem to infringe the very substance of the freedom of an internet 
service provider . . . to conduct a business.”167 This was for two main 
reasons. First, the outcome prohibition “[left] its addressee to 
determine the specific measures to be taken in order to achieve the 
result sought, with the result that he [could] choose to put in place 
measures which are best adapted to the resources and abilities 
available to him.”168 Second, the Court’s conclusion was couched in 
the particular procedural form of an order at issue that allowed the 
ISP to avoid liability by showing that it had taken all reasonable 
steps to comply with injunction. That “possibility of exoneration,” 
according to the Court, “clearly [had] the effect that the addressee of 
the injunction [would] not be required to make unbearable 
sacrifices.”169 
The Court thus appeared to suggest that the result-tailored 
injunctions less encroach on the freedom to conduct a business than 
their specific counterparts, as long as the former leave ISPs to make 
their enforcement choices freely. Some commentators disputed this 
conclusion. It was observed in particular that the “ISPs typically 
want specific conditions to be stated,” because, if not, they risk 
penalties for non-compliance.170 Quite the same with the possibility 
 
 166.  Id. at ¶ 50. 
 167.  Id. at ¶ 51 (emphasis added). 
 168.  Id. at ¶ 52. 
 169.  Id. at ¶ 53. 
 170.  Pekka Savola, Website Blocking in Copyright Injunctions: A Further 
Perspective, THE 1709 BLOG (March 28, 2014), http://the1709blog.blogspot.fr/ 
2014/03/website-blocking-in-copyright.html (emphasis added). See also in this 
sense Husovec, CJEU Allowed Website Blocking Injunctions with Some 
Reservations, supra note 55, at 632; Christina Angelopoulos, CJEU in UPC 
Telekabel Wien: A Totally Legal Court Order. . . To Do the Impossible, KLUWER 
COPYRIGHT BLOG (Apr. 3, 2014), http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2014/04/03/upc-
telekabel-wien/; Steven James, Digesting Lush v Amazon and UPC Telekabel: Are 
We Asking Too Much of Online Intermediaries?, 25 ENT. L. REV. 175, 177 (2014), 
stating that “many ISPs would probably prefer to be subject to a specific injunction 
which tells them exactly what they must do rather than risk falling short of what 
the court requires.” It is also submitted that the right-holders might not be satisfied 
with this “blocking shopping” either, “since they will not be able to insist on the 
exact form of blocking that an ISP must apply under the injunction” (Joel Smith et 
al., ISPs and Blocking Injunctions: UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film 
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of exoneration envisaged in Austrian outcome prohibition, as, when 
taking “all reasonable measures,” the ISPs have also to respect the 
users’ information rights – a situation leaving an intermediary to 
navigate between possible liability for breach of the order and a 
potential dispute with its customers on the freedom of expression 
grounds.171 
All in all, despite the particular conclusion reached by the Court in 
Telekabel, the costs and complexity of blocking were highlighted as 
an important factor in the proportionality evaluation. In the Sabam 
cases,172 this criterion even led the CJEU to outlaw an injunction that 
required an ISP to install, as a preventive measure and exclusively at 
its own expense, a permanent system for filtering all electronic 
communications passing via its services. According to the CJEU, 
[S]uch an injunction would result in a serious infringement of the freedom 
of the ISP concerned to conduct its business since it would require that 
ISP to install a complicated, costly, permanent computer system at its own 
expense, which would also be contrary to the conditions laid down in 
Article 3(1) of Directive 2004/48, which requires that measures to ensure 
the respect of intellectual-property rights should not be unnecessarily 
complicated or costly.173 
The Deep Packet Inspection – a blocking technique that implies 
monitoring network traffic for infringing content174 – is considered to 
be the most problematic from the costs and complexity 
perspective.175 Accordingly, as Martin Husovec submits, “if the court 
were to require that a provider implement a system of Deep Packet 
Inspection by a smaller provider, it can be well argued that the latter 
 
Verleih GmbH and and Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH (C-314/12), 36(7) 
EIPR 470, 474 (2014)). 
 171.  This ISP dilemma was also pointed at by the Advocate General Cruz 
Villalón in his Opinion on UPC Telekabel Wien [2013], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2013:781, at ¶ 89. 
 172.  CJEU, Judgment in Scarlet Extended [2011], C-70/10, EU:C:2011:771; 
and CJEU, Judgment in SABAM v. Netlog [2012], C-360/10, EU:C:2012:85. 
 173.  CJEU, Judgment in Scarlet Extended [2011], C-70/10, EU:C:2011:771, at 
¶ 48; and, by analogy, CJEU, Judgment in SABAM v. Netlog [2012], C-360/10, 
EU:C:2012:85, at ¶ 46. See also, in the trademark context, CJEU, Judgment in 
L’Oréal v. eBay [2011], C-324/09, EU:C:2011:474, at ¶ 139. 
 174.  Ofcom, supra note 73, at 39. See also Cartier International AG & Ors v. 
British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), at ¶ 25. 
 175.  Ofcom, supra note 73, at 5, 40-41. 
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is not obliged to do so due to considerations of personal cost.”176 
It is notable to observe that both Sabam and Telekabel judgments 
seem to assume that an ISP is the one to carry the costs of 
implementation.177 
An alternative approach to the allocation of costs was suggested 
by the Advocate General in his opinion on specific blocking 
measures.178 As it was considered there, “[s]hould a specific measure 
prove to be disproportionate . . . in view of its complexity, costs and 
duration, it must be considered whether proportionality can be 
established by a partial or full assumption of the cost burden by the 
right-holder.”179 It is indeed this approach that was taken up recently 
in France, where the High Court of Paris (Tribunal de Grande 
Instance de Paris) noted that it will be up to the ISPs concerned to 
demand, if they wish so, the payment of their fees from the right-
holders (the French collecting society in that case), having regard to 
the measures actually taken and expenses specifically incurred for 
 
 176.  Husovec, CJEU Allowed Website Blocking Injunctions with Some 
Reservations, supra note 55, at 634. 
 177.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 50; CJEU, Judgment in Scarlet Extended [2011], C-70/10, 
EU:C:2011:771, at ¶ 48 (“[an injunction at issue] would require that ISP to install 
a . . . computer system at its own expense”) (emphasis added); see also CJEU, 
Judgment in SABAM v. Netlog [2012], C-360/10, EU:C:2012:85, at ¶ 46. In 
Cartier I, Justice Arnold was likewise of the opinion that Telekabel supported his 
view that “the ISPs should generally bear the costs of implementation as part of the 
costs of carrying on business in this sector” (Cartier International AG & Ors v. 
British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), at ¶ 240). See also 
Savola, supra note 8, at ¶ 44; and, from the same author, INTERNET CONNECTIVITY 
PROVIDERS AS INVOLUNTARY COPYRIGHT ENFORCERS: BLOCKING WEBSITES IN 
PARTICULAR 89 et seq. (2015), https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/153602. 
 178.  Note that the question about specific measures was not addressed by the 
Telekabel Court: it was not necessary for the CJEU to reply to this question, given 
its finding of lawfulness of generic blocking orders. 
 179.  CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in UPC Telekabel 
Wien [2013], C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781, at ¶ 106 (emphasis added). In this sense, 
see also Savola, supra note 8, at ¶ 79 contending that, “[g]iven that blocking 
furthers the IPR holder’s private interest, and the IPR holder is also the sole 
beneficiary, it would not seem unreasonable for it to cover all costs. This would 
guide it to do a rigorous assessment of which blocking would be economically 
justified”; and Husovec, supra note 8, at ¶ 49 (“[I]t is theoretically possible to see 
injunctions against innocent third parties being issued only on the promise that 
right holders will pay the implementation costs.”). 
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the implementation of the orders.180 The French court did not see any 
contradiction in this allocation of costs to Telekabel. On the contrary, 
and with express reference to the latter, it held that such allocation 
was justified by the fact that the ISP was “not the author of the 
infringement of the fundamental right of intellectual property which 
has led to the adoption of the injunction.”181 
Yet somewhat different approach to considering costs was 
advanced by Justice Arnold in Cartier I.182 There, a contention was 
made that, although allocated with the ISPs, the costs would not 
ultimately be borne by them, as the ISPs are likely to simply pass on 
the blocking costs to their customers in the form of higher 
subscription fees.183 This re-allocation, in turn, would ease the burden 
on the ISPs’ business, which would not be compromised by the 
competitive disadvantage, since all ISPs would be approximately in 
the same situation, being required to take equivalent measures.184 
According to Justice Arnold, given this level playing field, “[t]he 
effect of this would be the familiar one of requiring the community 
as a whole (in this case, the community of broadband users in the 
UK) to pay the costs of law enforcement action against the minority 
of people who behave unlawfully or who take advantage of the 
unlawful behavior of others (in this case, by accessing infringing 
websites). This is a solution that has been adopted in many other 
contexts, most obviously in the funding of police forces through 
 
 180.  Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris [High Court of Paris], 3rd chamber, 
SCPP v. Orange, Free, SFR et Bouygues Télécom, No. 14/03236, Dec. 4, 2014, 
supra note 65, at 18. 
 181.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 51, cited in: Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris [High 
Court of Paris], 3rd chamber, SCPP v. Orange, Free, SFR et Bouygues Télécom, 
No. 14/03236, Dec. 4, 2014, id., at 18. It is worth noting, however, that, in 
Telekabel, the fact that the ISP was not “the author of the infringement” was 
brought to justify the particular procedural form of Austrian outcome prohibition, 
allowing its addressee to avoid liability by proving that it had taken all reasonable 
measures to implement an injunction. The CJEU therefore did not pronounce on 
any justifications of allocating the implementation costs with anyone but an 
intermediary against whom an injunction was issued, which seems to be a default 
option anyway. 
 182.  Cartier International AG & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors 
[2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch). 
 183.  Id. at ¶ 252. 
 184.  Id. 
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general taxation.”185 It thus followed that the implementation costs 
did not lead to the conclusion that the blocking should be refused as 
disproportionate.186 The fact remained, though, that the costs-factor 
was “central to the assessment of proportionality.”187 Neither did 
Justice Arnold rule out “the possibility of ordering the right-holder to 
pay some or all of the implementation costs in an appropriate 
case.”188 
B. AVAILABILITY OF REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES 
(SUBSIDIARITY) 
Another important factor that comes to balancing in website 
blocking cases is the proportionality of going after an Internet access 
provider instead of trying to put an end to infringement at its source, 
by suing, for example, direct infringers or website operators. The 
InfoSoc Directive seemed to have already answered this question 
back in 2001 when it stated (in Recital 59) that “[i]n the digital 
environment, in particular, the services of intermediaries may 
increasingly be used by third parties for infringing activities. In many 
cases such intermediaries are best placed to bring such infringing 
activities to an end.”189 As aptly noted by Justice Arnold, the 
rationale for going after the access providers (and in particular those 
of end users) is hence “that [such intermediaries] are the ‘lowest cost 
avoiders’ of infringement.”190 The InfoSoc left it open, however, 
whether the right-holders are required to try all other reasonable 
remedies first, before recourse is made to the Internet access 
provider. Neither was this issue addressed by the Telekabel Court, 
which only highlighted that the blocking was justified in the light of 
the objective of the InfoSoc, “as shown in particular by Recital 9 
thereof, which is to guarantee right-holders a high level of 
protection.”191 
 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. at ¶ 253. 
 187.  Id. at ¶ 204. 
 188.  Id. at ¶ 240. 
 189.  Recital 59 of the InfoSoc Directive, supra note 5 (emphasis added). 
 190.  Cartier International AG & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors 
[2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), at ¶ 251. See also Lodder & van der Meulen, supra note 
3, at ¶ 10 observing that “[a]ccess providers are the gate to the virtual world, and 
consequently are an obvious party to appoint as norm enforcer or gate keeper.” 
 191.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
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The question on reasonable alternatives is nevertheless important, 
as the human rights law requires that any restriction on a 
fundamental right (the ISPs’ freedom to conduct a business in this 
case) should be the least intrusive measure which would effectively 
protect the counterbalanced interest (i.e. the right-holders’ property). 
As recalled by Janneke Gerards, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), the Canadian Supreme Court, the 
ECtHR and the CJEU all apply this requirement, which is mostly 
known as a “least intrusive means” test192 or the test of necessity. “In 
this definition, the test requires that, of all the instruments that could 
be chosen to achieve the aims pursued, that instrument must be 
selected which is least problematic from the perspective of the 
individual rights at stake.”193 It is also famously explained by the 
metaphor of a sledgehammer that should not be used to crack a 
nut.194 
Although both the InfoSoc and the Enforcement Directive 
envisage the possibility of applying for injunctions “[w]ithout 
prejudice to any other measures, procedures and remedies 
available,”195 certain national courts have taken the subsidiarity 
criterion on board in their assessments of proportionality of the 
blocking.196 A recent decision by the German Federal Supreme Court 
 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 31 (emphasis added). 
 192.  Janneke Gerards, How to Improve the Necessity Test of the European 
Court of Human Rights, 11(2) INT'L. J. CONSTIT. L. 466, 482 (2013). 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  R. v. Goldstein [1983] 1 WLR 151, at 155. See further Aharon Barak, 
PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 333-337 
(2012, Doron Kalir trans.); The Rt. Hon. Lord Hoffmann, The Influence of the 
European Principle of Proportionality Upon UK Law, in THE PRINCIPLE OF 
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE 107, 108 (Evelyn Elllis ed., 1999); 
Garreth Wong, Towards the Nutcracker Principle: Reconsidering the Objections to 
Proportionality, PUBLIC LAW 92 (2000); T. Jeremy Gunn, Deconstructing 
Proportionality in Limitations Analysis, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 465, 467 (2005); 
Eva Brems & Laurens Lavrysen, ‘Don’t Use a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut’: 
Less Restrictive Means in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
15(1) HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 139 (2015). 
 195.  Recital 23 of the Enforcement Directive, supra note 6; analogously, 
Recital 59 of the InfoSoc Directive, supra note 5. 
 196.  See also Savola, supra note 8, at 83 (observing that, “[w]hile injunctions 
may be ordered without prejudice to the other actions available to the right 
holder . . . , the novel part is taking this into account in the proportionality 
evaluation”). 
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of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) is illustrative in this respect. In the 
November 2015 judgments on two cases brought by the German 
Music Industry and the German collecting society GEMA, 
respectively, the Court rejected to order the local Internet access 
provider to block its customers’ access to the file-sharing website 
goldesel.to.197 This was because the claimants failed to show that 
they tried, with due diligence, to sue the primary or secondary 
infringers first.198 According to Bundesgerichtshof, blocking 
injunctions against the Internet access provider 
can only be considered if the right-holder has initially made reasonable 
efforts to take action against those parties who committed the 
infringement themselves (such as the owner of the website) or who have 
contributed to the infringement by the provision of services (such as the 
hosting provider). Recourse to the access provider is only reasonable 
when recourse to those parties fails or lacks any prospect of success, 
thereby creating a lacuna in legal protection. Operators and host providers 
are much closer to the infringement than those who only generally 
provide access to the Internet.199 
Consequently, “when determining the priority of those against 
whom the claim should be brought, the right-holder has to a 
reasonable extent make enquiries.”200 In the Court’s view, those 
could comprise “hiring a detective agency or having recourse to the 
 
 197.  Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court of Justice], I ZR 
174/14, Nov. 26, 2015, supra note 65. For a comment on these cases, see Martin 
Schaefer, ISP Liability Finally Achieved in Germany, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG 
(Dec. 22, 2015), http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2015/12/22/isp-liability-finally-
achieved-in-germany/; Eleonora Rosati, Blocking Orders Across Europe: 
Personality Disorder or are the Swedes Right?, IPKAT (Dec. 1, 2015), 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.fr/2015/12/blocking-orders-across-europe.html; Martin 
Husovec, BGH Accepts Website Blocking Injunctions, HUŤKO´S TECHNOLOGY 
LAW BLOG (Nov. 29, 2015), http://www.husovec.eu/2015/11/bgh-accepts-website-
blocking-injunctions.html. 
 198.  Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court of Justice], I ZR 3/14, 
Nov. 26, 2015, id. at ¶¶ 68-75; Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court 
of Justice], I ZR 174/14, Nov. 26, 2015, id. at ¶¶ 81-87. 
 199.  Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court of Justice], I ZR 3/14 
and I ZR 174/14, Judgments of Nov. 26, 2015, Press Release No. 194/2015, 
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=pm&Datum=2015&Sort=3&
nr=72928&pos=14&anz=209, translation from German by the authors. 
 200.  Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court of Justice], Press 
Release, id. 
GEIGER; THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT ONLINE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2016  3:03 PM 
2016] HUMAN RIGHTS IN COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 85 
state investigation authorities.”201 Thereby, importance of the least 
intrusive reasonable alternatives, balancing the rights of copyright 
holders with those of access providers (but also those of users), was 
acknowledged by the Bundesgerichtshof. 
Availability of alternative enforcement options was likewise 
accepted as “a factor to be taken into account in assessing the 
proportionality of the [blocking] orders” in the Cartier I judgment 
from the UK.202 There, Justice Arnold considered in detail all 
alternatives that were available to the claimants203 – the trademark 
owners (collectively, Richemont) in that case that sought orders 
requiring five major UK ISPs to block, or at least impede, access by 
their subscribers to six websites which advertised and sold 
counterfeit goods. On the facts, six alternative measures were 
established, two of which were indeed used by the claimants. That 
use did not appear decisive, however, as none of the six measures 
that Richemont could adopt were considered “equally effective, but 
less burdensome” alternatives.204 On the other hand, it was admitted 
that some of those measures had to be taken into account in the 
proportionality analysis.205 A heated debate centred on notice-and-
takedown by hosts as a possible effective alternative that the 
claimants did not adopt.206 Although it was accepted that “website 
blocking orders impos[ed] compliance costs on the ISPs, whereas 
notice-and-takedown requests to the hosts [did] not,” Justice Arnold 
was “not persuaded that, overall, notice-and-takedown [was] an 
equally effective, but less onerous, measure.”207 Several possible 
alternatives to website blocking were likewise considered – and 
rejected as ineffective – in the recent Cartier II judgment from 
February 2016 – the case that concerned yet another website 
 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Cartier International AG & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors 
[2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), at ¶ 217. 
 203.  Id. at ¶¶ 197-217. 
 204.  Id. at ¶ 217. 
 205.  See also in this sense Callanan et al., supra note 73, at 94 noting that “the 
availability of other enforcement options, that offer other more effective methods 
of preventing access to the material, should also be assessed – especially if they are 
less costly, less intrusive or more effective towards the availability of the 
material.” 
 206.  Cartier International AG & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors 
[2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), at ¶¶ 199-204. 
 207.  Id. at ¶ 204. 
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blocking action on the grounds of trademark infringement between 
the same parties as those of Cartier I.208 
As noted above, the Telekabel decision left intact the question on 
justifiability of blocking in the light of reasonable alternatives. The 
Advocate General, however, was more nuanced in his approach, 
having noted that “[t]he measure ordered must also not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objective, and, of several 
appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous.”209 
Having highlighted further that the order in Telekabel concerned not 
even the infringer’s ISP, but simply an ISP of accessing users, he 
stated that it was “obvious that an intermediary who is not 
contractually linked to the copyright infringer can in no 
circumstances be held unconditionally responsible for the 
termination of the infringement.”210 According to the AG, “the 
originator must, as a matter of priority, so far as possible, claim 
directly against the operators of the illegal website or their ISP.”211 
Only in the situations when such claim is not possible, can recourse 
be made to the ISP of end users. As an illustration of such a situation, 
the AG brought an example of a website placed online by a non-
European ISP, with a consequence that “the website and its operators 
often cannot be prosecuted.”212 Only then, according to the AG, an 
intermediary which is not in a contractual relationship with the 
operator of the copyright-infringing website can be an “appropriate 
starting point.”213 Thus, consonant with the recent 
Bundesgerichtshof’s pronouncement in particular and the least-
intrusive-means test in general, an injunction would only be justified 
subject to the lack of other reasonable alternatives available to the 
right-holders.214 Then again, the lack thereof might be something for 
 
 208.  Cartier International Ltd & Anor v. British Telecommunications Plc & Ors 
[2016] EWHC 339 (Ch), at ¶¶ 54-62. 
 209.  CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in UPC Telekabel 
Wien [2013], C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781, at ¶ 103. 
 210.  Id. at ¶ 58 (emphasis added). 
 211.  Id. at ¶ 107. 
 212.  Id. at ¶ 57. 
 213.  Id. See also in this sense Savola, supra note 8, at ¶ 85 observing that, “if 
there is evidence that the website has repeatedly changed providers (as with The 
Pirate Bay) or the administrators are anonymous and difficult to identify, 
addressing the issue at the user end might be more easily proportionate.” 
 214.  Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Supreme Court of Justice], I ZR 3/14, 
Nov. 26, 2015, supra note 65, at ¶¶ 68-75; Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal 
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the right-holders to prove.215 
A different approach was adopted, however, by the High Court of 
Paris in its judgment of November 2013, where it was ruled that, “if 
the text of Article L.336-2 of the Code of Intellectual Property [the 
national implementation of Article 8(3) InfoSoc] is addressed to 
anyone who can contribute to remedy the violations of protected 
rights, no legal provision requires calling in the same instance the 
hosting providers and no principle of subsidiarity is envisaged.”216 
The same approach is followed in Belgium, where the Antwerp 
Court of Appeals likewise stroke out the subsidiarity factor on 
consideration that it was not required by Article 8(3) InfoSoc.217 As 
Pekka Savola reports, targeting the direct infringers was also not 
required on an application of national law by the Helsinki Court of 
Appeals in June 2012.218 
C.  LINKS TO INFRINGEMENT: GOING AFTER NON-LIABLE 
INTERMEDIARIES 
Another question, which is closely related to the reasonable-
alternatives test, but yet needs to be distinguished from it, is the 
question on the links of the injunctions with infringement. In 
Telekabel, the question was raised on whether it was possible at all to 
claim an injunction against an ISP of accessing users and not only 
that of the infringing website. In this regard, it was disputed by the 
ISP that the blocking order could be addressed to it, as it neither had 
a contractual relationship with the person infringing copyright, nor 
was it established that its own customers were accessing the website 
at issue. 
Although not addressed by the CJEU under the “right to conduct a 
business” framework, this was an important question that merited a 
 
Supreme Court of Justice], I ZR 174/14, Nov. 26, 2015, supra note 65, at ¶¶ 81-87. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris [High Court of Paris], APC and 
Others v. Auchan Telecom and Others, No. 11/60013, Nov. 28, 2013, translation 
from French by the authors (emphasis added). 
 217.  Hof van Beroep, Antwerpen [Antwerp Court of Appeals], VZW Belgian 
Anti-Piracy Federation v. NV Telenet, No. 2011/8314, Sept. 26, 2011, supra note 
103, cited in: Savola, supra note 8, at ¶ 59. 
 218.  Helsinki Court of Appeals, Elisa, No. S 11/3097, June 15, 2012, cited in: 
Savola, supra note 8, at ¶ 55. 
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separate examination by the Luxemburg Court and which might also 
in the future equally fall under Article 16 EU Charter within the 
above-mentioned least-intrusive means test. 
As claimed by the ISP at issue in Telekabel, infringement was 
being committed by making the work available to the public without 
its involvement. Consequently, it was only remotely connected to an 
act of infringement and could not be considered an intermediary 
whose services were “used” – for the purposes of Article 8(3) 
InfoSoc – by the copyright infringer. 
The CJEU disagreed, holding that “neither the wording of 
Article 8(3) nor any other provision of Directive 2001/29 indicat[ed] 
that a specific relationship between the person infringing copyright 
or a related right and the intermediary [was] required.”219 According 
to the Court, such a conclusion was borne out by the objective of the 
InfoSoc, as spelled out in Recital 9 thereof, to guarantee the right-
holders “a high level of protection.”220 In view of this objective, it 
was sufficient that the Internet access provider was “an inevitable 
actor in any transmission of an infringement over the internet,” 
insofar as, “in granting access to the network, it [made] that 
transmission possible.”221 Neither was it required, in order to obtain 
an injunction against an Internet access provider, to show that the 
customers of that provider actually accessed, on the website at issue, 
the infringing material.222 In this regard, the CJEU reiterated its 
earlier finding that injunction can be issued with the purpose of not 
only ending infringements of copyright, but also of preventing 
them.223 Consequently, viewed in the light of this injunctions’ 
 
 219.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 35 (emphasis added). 
 220.  Id. at ¶¶ 33 and 35 (emphasis added). 
 221.  Id. at ¶ 31, with further references to ECJ, Order in LSG-Gesellschaft zur 
Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechten [2009], C-557/07, EU:C:2009:107, at ¶ 
44. In that case, the CJEU held that “access providers which merely provide users 
with Internet access, without offering other services such as email, FTP or file-
sharing services or exercising any control, whether de iure or de facto, over the 
services which users make use of, must be regarded as ‘intermediaries’ within the 
meaning of Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29” (at ¶ 46). 
 222.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 36. 
 223.  Id. at ¶ 37, with further references to CJEU, Judgment in Scarlet Extended 
[2011], C-70/10, EU:C:2011:771, at ¶ 31; and CJEU, Judgment in SABAM v. 
Netlog [2012], C-360/10, EU:C:2012:85, at ¶ 29. The recent CJEU judgment in 
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“preventive effect,”224 even the users’ ISP had to be regarded as an 
intermediary whose services are used by a third party to infringe 
copyright.225 
The question on how remote should be the link between an act of 
infringement and an ISP was somewhat differently addressed in 
Sweden. Interestingly, Sweden has not transposed Article 8(3) of the 
Copyright Directive by directly inserting the wording of that article 
in its Copyright Act. Instead, Article 53(b) of the Swedish Copyright 
Act explicitly states that, for an injunction to be issued against the 
party who is not a direct infringer, that party should be contributory 
liable. On this basis, in a recent judgment of November 2015, the 
Stockholm District Court refused an order against the Swedish 
Internet access provider B2 requiring it to block its subscribers’ 
access to The Pirate Bay and the local streaming service 
Swefilmer.226 According to the Swedish court, as it was not 
established that B2 contributed to copyright infringement, an 
injunction could not be granted against it. As noted by some 
commentators, it might not necessarily be the case that Article 53(b) 
of the Swedish Copyright Act is incompatible with the InfoSoc, as 
“[i]t would appear from the wording of both Article 8(3) of the 
InfoSoc Directive and the (soft) language employed by the CJEU in 
Telekabel that what is required from Member States under EU law is 
 
Mc Fadden is also in this line: see CJEU, Judgment in Mc Fadden [2016], C-
484/14, EU:C:2016:689 (finding that, in order to prevent copyright infringement 
from occurring, the provider of an open Wi-Fi can be required to password-protect 
its network). See also, in relation to trademarks, CJEU, Judgment in L’Oréal v. 
eBay [2011], C-324/09, EU:C:2011:474, at ¶ 144. 
 224.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 38. 
 225.  Id. at ¶ 40. For an interesting analysis of website blocking against non-
liable intermediaries as a phenomenon that extends the rights’ enforcement 
“against persons that are too far for tort law,” see Husovec, supra note 8, at ¶ 51. 
According to this author, “the theory behind such an extension can be found in the 
Roman notion of ‘in rem action’” (id.). 
 226.  Stockholms Tingsrätt [Stockholm District Court], Universal Music 
Aktiebolag and Others v. B2 Bredband AB, No. T 15142-14, Nov. 27, 2015. For a 
comment, see Rosati, supra note 197; Samuel Gibbs, Sweden Refuses to Order ISP 
to Block Pirate Bay, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2015/nov/30/pirate-bay-stockholm-district-court-sweden-refuses-
order-isp-block-site; Nedim Malovic, Stockholm District Court Refuses to Issue 
Blocking Injunction Against Access Provider, IPKAT (March 4, 2016), 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.fr/2016/03/stockholm-district-court-refuses-to.html. 
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only to ensure that right-holders are in a position to apply for an 
injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third 
party to infringe copyright or a related right.”227 This was indeed the 
position taken up by the Swedish Government. The latter pointed to 
Recital 59 of the InfoSoc that left it to the national law of the 
Member States to determine “[t]he conditions and modalities” 
relating to injunctions. According to the Swedish Government, it was 
thus not necessary for the Swedish law – in order to meet the InfoSoc 
Directive’s requirements under Article 8(3) – to provide that it 
should always be possible for right-holders to claim an injunction 
against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to 
infringe copyright or related rights.228 However, the decision of the 
Stockholm District Court has already been appealed by the right-
holders and is currently pending before the Svea hovrätt (Swedish 
Court of Appeal)229 which is likely to shed further light on this 
issue.230 
D.  SHIFT OF ENFORCEMENT BURDENS ON INTERMEDIARIES 
As the above considerations demonstrate, a general trend can be 
observed in European law (with some deviations) to shift 
enforcement burdens on intermediaries.231 In this sense, Telekabel 
 
 227.  Rosati, id. See also in this sense Husovec, CJEU Allowed Website 
Blocking Injunctions with Some Reservations, supra note 55, at 633 observing that 
Telekabel decision “does not address whether the website-blocking injunctions are 
required by European Union law under Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive, but 
only whether they are compatible with it” (emphasis in the original). 
 228.  Stockholms Tingsrätt [Stockholm District Court], Universal Music 
Aktiebolag and Others v. B2 Bredband AB, No. T 15142-14, Nov. 27, 2015, supra 
note 226, at 23-24. Cf. BASCAP report, supra note 2, at 77 (“This action [website 
blocking] should not require a finding that the ISP itself has engaged in any 
unlawful conduct, as the remedy is to prevent harm caused by infringements by 
third-party sites or services”) (emphasis added). 
 229.  Erik Wisterberg, Bredbandsbolaget friades – nu överklagas 
blockeringsdomen, DAGENS MEDIA (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.dagensmedia.se/ 
medier/digitalt/bredbandsbolaget-friades-nu-overklagas-blockeringsdomen-62407 
41. 
 230.  The reference to the CJEU can also be expected. 
 231.  See, e.g., EU Council, Presidency Paper on Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, 501
st
 Sess., Doc. No. 13076/14 (2014), at 2-3 stating that, in order 
for the current legislative framework to fit for the purpose of the digital 
environment, “[i]t is important to . . . [i]mprove the efficiency of actions to stop 
IPR infringements through better involvement of intermediaries” (emphasis 
added). See also the very recent Proposal for a Directive of the European 
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contributes to the growing number of laws and judicial decisions that 
put the burden of IP enforcement, previously allocated primarily with 
the right-holders, on the ISPs.232 
The main concern of those opposing this shift of IP enforcement 
competences usually deals with the argument that, once 
intermediaries are asked to do more in their new role of active IP 
enforcers, “it may be hard to identify a plausible cut-off point”233 at 
which “impartial enforcement” would not be at risk.234 Nevertheless, 
there might not be a “black and white” solution to this problem, 
which boils down – again – to the question of “fair balancing” of all 
the interests and rights involved.235 
 
Parliament and of the Council On Copyright in the Digital Single Market - 
COM(2016)593 (Brussels, Sept. 14, 2016), Recital 38 (“. . . information society 
service providers storing and providing access to the public to large amounts of 
copyright protected works or other subject-matter uploaded by their users should 
take appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure protection of works or 
other subject-matter, such as implementing effective technologies. . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
 232.  For an overview of the current initiatives requiring Internet access 
providers to take “a more active role” in combating copyright infringement, see the 
BASCAP report, supra note 2, at 69. The report outlines those initiatives as 
follows: “(a) implementing and enforcing terms of service by which the customer 
agrees not to engage in P2P or other illegal activities; (b) adopting ‘graduated 
response programs’ by which customers engaging in P2P infringements can be 
educated and provided with a notice and, in appropriate circumstances, can be 
sanctioned; (c) participating in public awareness programs; and (d) site blocking 
based on orders from competent authorities” (id.). 
 233.  Maurice Schellekens, Liability of Internet Intermediaries: A Slippery 
Slope?, 8(2) SCRIPTED 154, 154 (2011). 
 234.  Niva Elkin-Koren, After Twenty Years: Revisiting Copyright Liability of 
Online Intermediaries, in THE EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM OF COPYRIGHT IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 29, 48 (Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais eds., 2014). 
 235.  Lodder & van der Meulen, supra note 3, at ¶ 69. See also in this sense, 
Jeremy de Beer & Christopher D. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright 
Enforcement: A Non-Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS 
375, 409 (2009), observing that “[w]hether or not intermediaries should ultimately 
play a more active-preventative role in online copyright enforcement remains an 
open question [which] . . . can be answered in an intelligent manner only if 
lawmakers and policymakers are informed about its broader context and 
implications.” For further discussion of the role of ISPs in digital copyright 
enforcement, see Benjamin Farrand, The Future of Copyright Enforcement Online: 
Intermediaries Caught Between Formal and Informal Governance in the EU, in 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EU AND INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 397, supra 
note 54; Anjanette H. Raymond, Intermediaries’ Precarious Balance Within 
Europe: Oddly Placed Cooperative Burdens in the Online World, 11 NW. J. TECH. 
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The same cannot be said, however, of the shift of the fundamental-
rights balancing on the third parties, which occurred in Telekabel. 
There, indeed, the Luxemburg Court went on to transfer to the ISPs 
not only the burdens of enforcing IP, but also those of balancing the 
fundamental rights at issue. According to the CJEU, it was for the 
ISP (and not the national court) to ensure that a “fair balance” 
between the different fundamental rights was struck.236 Failing that, a 
(non-liable) intermediary would either risk a dispute with its 
customers on the grounds of unjustified interference with their 
freedom of information or face the coercive penalties for non-
compliance with the outcome prohibition. 
This shift of the burden of human-rights enforcement resulted 
from the CJEU allowing generic injunctions alongside their specific 
counterparts. Under the outcome prohibition, in particular, whether 
the blocking takes account of the parties’ fundamental rights is not 
examined before the order is made.237 
The Advocate General was clearly concerned about this shift of 
proportionality evaluation to the enforcement stage of proceedings 
and, unlike the CJEU, was of the opinion that generic injunctions 
were simply not precise enough to comply with Union law.238 In his 
opinion, an outcome prohibition (unlike the measure-specific 
injunctions) failed with regard to proportionality “[i]n logical terms 
alone,” but also in light of the case law requirement that a balance of 
rights is observed before the injunction is issued.239 Likewise, Italy, 
 
& INTELL. PROP. 359 (2013); Jon Bright & José R. Agustina, Mediating 
Surveillance: The Developing Landscape of European Online Copyright 
Enforcement, 9(1) JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN RESEARCH 120 
(2013); Dennis S. Karjala, International Convergence on the Need for Third 
Parties to Become Internet Copyright Police (But Why?), 12(2) RICH. J. GLOBAL L. 
& BUS. 189 (2013); Uta Kohl, The Rise and Rise of Online Intermediaries in the 
Governance of the Internet and Beyond – Connectivity Intermediaries, 26 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW, COMPUTERS AND TECHNOLOGY 185 (2012); 
Giblin, supra note 147; Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19(2) 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253 (2006). 
 236.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 55. 
 237.  See CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in UPC Telekabel 
Wien [2013], C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781, at ¶ 68. 
 238.  Id. at ¶¶ 85-90. 
 239.  Id. at ¶ 88. See also, highly critical of this move to take the fundamental-
rights balancing out of the court’s focus when granting the order, Husovec, CJEU 
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the Netherlands and the United Kingdom considered it to be “the 
task of the national courts to examine the nature of the injunction in 
the specific case in the light of certain requirements, in particular of 
the principle of proportionality and of a fair balance between the 
rights of the parties concerned.”240 Finally, the Commission also saw: 
[A] breach of the principle of proportionality in the inability of the 
national court to undertake a review of proportionality for lack of 
knowledge of the scope of the necessary measures, . . . [t]he possibility of 
avoiding incurring coercive penalties . . . [not being a] substitute for a 
proper review of proportionality when an injunction is issued.241 
It might therefore be preferable if the CJEU reconsiders its 
approach towards post factum “fair balancing” as not only being 
problematic in terms of the human rights law application, but also as 
burdening intermediaries with the tasks commonly attributed to the 
legislators or courts. While it might be true that “[i]n many cases . . . 
intermediaries are best placed to bring . . . infringing activities to an 
end,”242 they might not be best placed to judge on the matters of the 
human rights law application with its numerous tests and balancing 
criteria.243 The excessiveness of this burden was clearly recognized 
 
Allowed Website Blocking Injunctions with Some Reservations, supra note 55, at 
633. As argued by this author, it is not impossible that, might generic injunctions 
be brought to the scrutiny of the ECtHR one day, the Strasbourg Court would find 
them falling short of the quality of law foreseeability requirement. See id. at 634. 
 240.  CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in UPC Telekabel 
Wien [2013], C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781, at ¶ 64 (emphasis added). 
 241.  Id. at ¶ 66 (emphasis added). 
 242.  Recital 59 of the InfoSoc Directive, supra note 5. 
 243.  Consider also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Lecture within the framework of the 
CEIPI Research Seminars: A Comparative Analysis of the Liability of 
Intermediaries for Facilitating Trade Mark Infringement (May 20, 2014, 
Strasbourg), noting that the CJEU in Telekabel basically made the ISPs responsible 
for the respect of fundamental rights, which is not common in international public 
law, where the fundamental rights violations are attributable to the States. 
Similarly voicing concerns about the fact that “[c]ompanies have increasingly 
become the arbiters of freedom of expression” and other fundamental rights, see 
the Final Report of the Global Commission on Internet Governance, One Internet 
(2016), https://www.ourinternet.org/report. For a comprehensive analysis of the 
question of what legal limitations follow from the human rights framework for 
self-regulation and privatized enforcement online, see the recent study by the 
Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam: Christina 
Angelopoulos et al., Study of Fundamental Rights Limitations for Online 
Enforcement through Self-Regulation (2015), http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/ 
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by the Advocate General, who pointed that “[i]f, in the interest of its 
customers’ freedom of information, [the ISP] decides on a mild 
blocking measure, it must fear a coercive penalty in the enforcement 
process. If it decides on a more severe blocking measure, it must fear 
a dispute with its customers. The reference to a possible opportunity 
to defend itself in the enforcement process does not in any way alter 
the ISP’s dilemma.”244 
On the other hand, possible adverse consequences of the CJEU 
allowing generic injunctions might not be far-reaching in certain 
parts of Europe. Under some Member States’ procedural laws 
comparable types of injunctions are simply not provided.245 That is 
the situation, notably, in the UK, where, as pointed by Justice 
Arnold, “the proportionality of a blocking order is bound to be a 
context-sensitive question.”246 Accordingly, “the Court will carefully 
consider such [proportionality] matters before any blocking order is 
made.”247 
However, the type of an order analogous to Austrian outcome 
prohibition requiring an ISP to implement “all appropriate measures 
to prevent access” exists, for example, in France. In the judgment of 
November 2013 (referred to above), the High Court of Paris 
(Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris) ordered the Internet access 
providers to block all sites belonging to Allostreaming network “by 
any effective means, including by blocking domain names.”248 
Following the CJEU judgment in Telekabel, this generalized 
 
download/1796. 
 244.  CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in UPC Telekabel 
Wien [2013], C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781, at ¶ 89. 
 245.  See Angelopoulos, supra note 170. See also Husovec, CJEU Allowed 
Website Blocking Injunctions with Some Reservations, supra note 55, at 633 
observing that “not all of the countries will be able to issue open-ended injunctions 
of this kind.” 
 246.  EMI Records Ltd & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2013] 
EWHC 379 (Ch), at ¶ 100. 
 247.  Id. at ¶ 97 (emphasis added). See also Cartier International Ltd & Anor v. 
British Telecommunications Plc & Ors [2016] EWHC 339 (Ch), at ¶ 48, where 
Judge Hacon highlighted that “proportionality must be assessed on the facts of 
each case and that it is possible for the injunction sought in [one case] to lack 
proportionality even though the one granted in [a similar case] did not.” 
 248.  Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris [High Court of Paris], APC and 
Others v. Auchan Telecom and Others, No. 11/60013, Nov. 28, 2013, supra note 
216, translation from French by the authors (emphasis added). 
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blocking has only flourished in France, the Tribunal de Grande 
Instance having already issued another decision requiring Internet 
access providers to implement “all appropriate measures to prevent 
access.”249 In a decision from December 2014, the court explicitly 
referred to Telekabel, noting that the French-style outcome 
prohibitions were justified insofar as they “allow[ed] each Internet 
access provider the opportunity to determine the specific nature of 
the measures to be implemented, with due regard to the legal and 
technical structure of its business, to the effects of the 
implementation measures and to the evolution of the dispute.”250 
Apart from the generic injunctions, which are now allowed by 
European case law, the shift of enforcement burdens also occurs on 
the level of voluntary agreements between the ISPs and right-
holders, for which no judicial oversight is required in some countries. 
This is the case in Portugal in particular, where the memorandum 
signed in 2015 between the Portugal’s Ministry of Culture, ISP 
group, and copyright holders including anti-piracy group MAPiNET 
did not envisage any degree of judicial control over the blocking.251 
This lack of judicial review might result in substantial overblocking, 
the most recent example being the blocking of a music news website 
for embedding official YouTube videos. As the TorrentFreak reports, 
the journalist running the website “works with international record 
labels who send him information about releases and even request that 
he embeds their videos in his site. However, local anti-piracy group 
MAPiNET believes that embedding YouTube videos is illegal unless 
Vinaixa’s [the journalist] website is licensed.”252 This is despite the 
CJEU’s 2014 finding in BestWater (building on Svensson) that 
embedding is not an infringement when content has already been 
 
 249.  Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris [High Court of Paris], 3rd chamber, 
SCPP v. Orange, Free, SFR et Bouygues Télécom, No. 14/03236, Dec. 4, 2014, 
supra note 65, at 15, translation from French by the authors. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  Andy, Rapid Pirate Site Blocking Mechanism Introduced by Portugal, 
TORRENTFREAK (July 31, 2015), https://torrentfreak.com/rapid-pirate-site-
blocking-mechanism-introduced-by-portugal-150731/; Andy, Portugal Rapidly & 
Voluntarily Blocks Dozens More “Pirate” Sites [Blog Post], TORRENTFREAK 
(Nov. 7, 2015), https://torrentfreak.com/portugal-rapidly-voluntarily-blocks-
dozens-more-pirate-sites-151107/. 
 252.  Andy, News Site Blocked by ISPs for Embedding Official YouTube Videos, 
TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 29, 2016), https://torrentfreak.com/news-site-blocked-by-
isps-for-embedding-youtube-videos-160129/. 
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made available (with the authorization of the right-holder) on a freely 
accessible basis on another website.253 
IV. A RIGHT TO PROPERTY PERSPECTIVE ON 
WEBSITE BLOCKING: TOWARDS A “HIGH 
LEVEL” OF PROTECTION? 
Another important fundamental right implicated by blocking 
injunctions is the right to property of IP holders. This is also the right 
against which the users’ freedom of information and the ISPs’ 
freedom to conduct a business need to be balanced. In Europe, this 
balancing is predetermined by the fundamental-right status of 
intellectual property as per Article 17(2) EU Charter and (somewhat 
implicitly) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR (1), as well as by 
considerations on how effective an enforcement of this fundamental 
right must be (2). The latter, in turn, would depend on what the 
European legislator regards as a valid objective of copyright 
protection (3). 
A.  IP AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
As noted by the ECtHR in the recent decision concerning The 
Pirate Bay: “As to the weight afforded to the interest of protecting 
the copyright-holders, the Court would stress that intellectual 
property benefits from the protection afforded by Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.”254 Consequently, as stated in that 
 
 253.  CJEU, Order in BestWater International [2014], C-348/13, 
EU:C:2014:2315; CJEU, Judgment in Svensson and Others [2014], C-466/12, 
EU:C:2014:76. Further on this, see the Opinion of the European Copyright Society 
on the reference to the CJEU in Case C-466/12 Svensson (Feb. 15, 2013), 
http://www.ceipi.edu/fileadmin/upload/DUN/CEIPI/Documents/Statement/Europe
an_Copyright_Society_Opinion_in_Case_C-466__12_Svensson-1.pdf; Francisco 
Cabrera Blázquez et al., Copyright Enforcement Online: Policies and Mechanisms 
57-59 (IRIS Plus, European Audiovisual Observatory, Strasbourg, 2015), 
http://publi.obs.coe.int/documents/205595/8261963/IRIS+plus+2015en3.pdf/890e
d458-f2a3-40b1-b4a6-2ac0d6310cbe. For the latest developments in the sphere of 
hyperlinking, see CJEU, Judgment in GS Media [2016], C-160/15, EU:C:2016:644 
(establishing that hyperlinking to unauthorized content is not a communication to 
the public if the “hyperlinker” did not know or could reasonably have known about 
the illegal nature of such content). 
 254.  ECtHR, Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (dec.) (No. 40397/12), 
CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC004039712, at 10. For a comment on this case, see 
Geiger & Izyumenko, supra note 121. 
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case and further reiterated in Akdeniz, when balancing two 
competing interests both protected by the Convention on the level of 
human rights, the States are afforded “a particularly wide” margin of 
appreciation.255 
The European position that IP by definition enjoys the human 
rights protection of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR and 
Article 17 of the EU Charter was patently predetermined by a 
number of prior developments on both judicial and legislative levels. 
First of all, the EU Charter, unlike the ECHR, expressly enshrined 
the protection of the right to intellectual property in its catalogue of 
rights under Article 17(2).256 The ECHR, on its part, although not 
containing a specific IP clause, has been interpreted within the years 
by the Strasbourg Court as extending its Article 1 Protocol No. 1 
protection to the entire range of traditionally recognized IP rights.257 
The most indicative in this regard is probably an oft-quoted 
Anheuser-Busch case, which expanded Article 1 First Protocol 
 
 255.  ECtHR, Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (dec.), id. at 11; ECtHR, 
Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 20877/10), CE:ECHR:2014:0311DEC002087710, 
at ¶ 28. See also ECtHR, Ashby Donald and Others v. France (No. 36769/08), 
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908, at ¶ 40. 
 256.  See generally Christophe Geiger, Intellectual “Property” after the Treaty 
of Lisbon: Towards a Different Approach in the New European Legal Order?, 
32(6) EIPR 255 (2010); and, from the same author, Intellectual Property Shall be 
Protected!? Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union: A Mysterious Provision With an Unclear Scope, 31(3) EIPR 113 (2009). 
 257.  See in the field of copyright: ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 
20877/10), CE:ECHR:2014:0311DEC002087710; ECtHR, Neij and Sunde 
Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (dec.) (No. 40397/12), CE:ECHR:2013:0219DEC 
004039712; ECtHR, Ashby Donald and Others v. France (No. 36769/08), 
CE:ECHR:2013:0110JUD003676908; ECtHR, Balan v. Moldova (No. 19247/03), 
CE:ECHR:2008:0129JUD001924703; ECtHR, Melnychuk v. Ukraine (dec.) (No. 
28743/03), CE:ECHR:2005:0705DEC002874303; ECtHR, Dima v. Romania 
(dec.) (No. 58472/00), CE:ECHR:2005:0526DEC005847200; ECommHR, Aral, 
Tekin and Aral v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 24563/94), CE:ECHR:1998:0114DEC 
002456394; ECommHR, A.D. v. the Netherlands (dec.) (No. 21962/93), 
CE:ECHR:1994:0111DEC002196293. In the field of trademarks: ECtHR, 
Paeffgen Gmbh v. Germany (dec.) (Nos. 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05 and 
21770/05), CE:ECHR:2007:0918DEC002537904; ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. 
Portugal [GC] (No. 73049/01), CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901. In the field 
of patent law: ECommHR, Lenzing AG v. United Kingdom (dec.) (No. 38817/97), 
CE:ECHR:1998:0909DEC003881797; ECommHR, Smith Kline & French Lab. 
Ltd. v. the Netherlands (dec.) (No. 12633/87), CE:ECHR:1990:1004DEC0012 
63387. 
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protection to “mere” applications for the registration of 
trademarks.258 
This European approach on an autonomous fundamental-right 
nature of intellectual property might lead, however (if only 
intuitively), to a more rigorous protection of IP interests vis-à-vis 
other fundamental rights that come to balancing, including the users’ 
information rights and the ISPs’ business freedom.259 
 
 258.  ECtHR, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC] (No. 73049/01), 
CE:ECHR:2007:0111JUD007304901. Further on this case, see Klaus-Dieter 
Beiter, The Right to Property and the Protection of Interests in Intellectual 
Property – A Human Rights Perspective on the European Court of Human Right’s 
Decision in Anheuser-Bush Inc v Portugal, 39(6) INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 714 (2008). 
 259.  See, e.g., Callanan et al., supra note 73, at 163 and 167, listing the 
fundamental right to intellectual property as a right that supports the blocking, 
contrasted with such rights as privacy and freedom of expression that might be 
endangered by it. For further critique of the approach towards treating the right to 
intellectual property and other fundamental rights “as if they were of equal rank,” 
see Alexander Peukert, The Fundamental Right to (Intellectual) Property and the 
Discretion of the Legislature, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 132, supra note 15; see also Robert Burrell & Dev 
Gangjee, Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression: A Call for Caution, 41(5) 
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 544 (2010); Christina J. 
Angelopoulos, Freedom of Expression and Copyright: The Double Balancing Act, 
3 IPQ 328 (2008). This approach might also appear in certain tension with Art. 
27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Art. 15(1)(c) of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
both of which secure to authors the benefits from the “protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from [their] scientific, literary or artistic production.” 
As stressed in the report by the UN Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural 
rights, although it is tempting to infer from the wording of these provisions that 
Art. 15(1)(c) recognizes a human right to protection of intellectual property, “this 
equation is false and misleading” (UN General Assembly, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Farida Shaheed, COPYRIGHT POLICY AND 
THE RIGHT TO SCIENCE AND CULTURE, Human Rights Council, Twenty-eighth 
session, A/HRC/28/57, Dec. 24, 2014, at ¶ 26, emphasis added). The UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) – the body in 
charge of the implementation of the ICESCR – made this abundantly clear in its 
General Comment No. 17 on Art. 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR (Jan. 12, 
2006, E/C.12/GC/17). According to the CESCR, an evident distinction exists in 
principle between standard IP rights and the human rights protection given to 
creators in accordance with Art. 15(1)(c). Thus, it is acknowledged by the CESCR 
that Art. 15(1)(c) guarantees some sort of protection; however, it cannot be 
interpreted as guaranteeing IP rights or as elevating IP to the human rights regime. 
Moreover, neither the UDHR nor the ICESCR determine that the material and 
immaterial interests of the creators should be protected by way of a property right. 
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On the other side, the potential negative consequences of the 
(human) right to property protection for IP should not be 
overestimated. As noted by the CJEU in Telekabel, “there is nothing 
whatsoever in the wording of Article 17(2) of the Charter to suggest 
that the right to intellectual property is inviolable and must for that 
reason be absolutely protected.”260 Article 17(2) of the Charter could 
then be considered to be nothing more than a simple clarification of 
Article 17(1), that clearly recalls that: “[t]he use of property may be 
regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.”261 
Likewise, the first paragraph of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
ECHR provides for the possibility of restrictions of the right “in the 
public interest,” while the second paragraph of the same provision 
allows the State “to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to 
control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest . . . .”262 
This limited nature of the right to property was clearly envisaged 
by the drafters of the ECHR and the Charter. As the travaux 
préparatoires of the First Protocol to the ECHR demonstrate, a 
newly introduced property paradigm was viewed as being of a 
“relative” nature as opposed to the absolute right to own property in 
a sense it was understood by Roman law.263 A similar logic, clearly 
excluding an “absolutist” conception of IP, accompanied the 
preparatory documents of the EU Charter, insofar as the drafters took 
care to specify that “the guarantees laid down in paragraph 1 [of 
Article 17] shall apply as appropriate to intellectual property” and 
 
 260.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 61. See also, to that effect, CJEU, Judgment in Scarlet 
Extended [2011], C-70/10, EU:C:2011:771, at ¶ 43; CJEU, Judgment in SABAM 
v. Netlog [2012], C-360/10, EU:C:2012:85, at ¶ 41; and, in the sphere of 
trademarks, ECJ, Judgment in Eurohypo v. OHIM (EUROHYPO) [2006], T-
439/04, EU:T:2006:119, at ¶ 21; CJEU, Judgment in Cytochroma Development v. 
OHIM – Teva Pharmaceutical Industries (ALPHAREN) [2013], T-106/12, 
EU:T:2013:340, at ¶ 45. 
 261.  Emphasis added. 
 262.  Emphasis added. 
 263.  Council of Europe, Preparatory Work on Article 1 of the First Protocol to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, CDH (76) 36, Strasbourg, Aug. 13, 
1976. See, e.g., presentation of Mr. de la Vallée-Poussin (Belgium), at 12; consider 
also the statement made by Mr. Nally (United Kingdom) at 16 that the “basis of 
Europe’s fight for survival is a struggle for the subordination of private property to 
the needs of the community.” 
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that “the meaning and scope of Article 17 are the same as those of 
the right guaranteed under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
ECHR.”264 
B. EFFECTIVENESS OF BLOCKING 
Even on admittance of the non-absolute nature of the right to 
intellectual property, the Court in Telekabel was yet of the opinion 
that it was necessary to achieve a “high level” of protection of this 
right.265 An important factor that comes to balancing in this 
connection is the required degree of effectiveness of blocking in 
terms of preventing unauthorized access. 
In Telekabel, the CJEU admitted that it was possible that “a means 
of putting a complete end to the infringements of the intellectual 
property right [did] not exist or [was] not in practice achievable, as a 
result of which some measures taken might be capable of being 
circumvented in one way or another.”266 Nonetheless, this did not 
preclude every blocking that – in view of the objective to guarantee 
right-holders a high level of protection – only had to be “sufficiently 
effective to ensure genuine protection of the fundamental right at 
issue.”267 According to the CJEU, this meant that an injunction “must 
have the effect of preventing unauthorized access to the protected 
subject-matter or, at least, of making it difficult to achieve and of 
seriously discouraging internet users . . . from accessing the subject-
matter made available to them in breach of . . . [the] fundamental 
right [to intellectual property].”268 
The issue of effectiveness was, however, somewhat differently 
addressed in the Netherlands, where the Court of Appeal of The 
Hague rejected (in a decision rendered two months prior to the CJEU 
judgment on Telekabel) to issue an order requiring two major Dutch 
 
 264.  Note from the Praesidium, supra note 53, Explanations on Art. 17 of the 
EU Charter, at 19-20. 
 265.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 35. 
 266.  Id. at ¶ 60. 
 267.  Id. at ¶ 62. 
 268.  Id. See also, more recently, finding that requiring the provider of an open 
Wi-Fi to password-protect its Internet connection in order to prevent copyright 
infringement was “necessary in order to ensure the effective protection of the 
fundamental right to protection of intellectual property,” CJEU, Judgment in Mc 
Fadden [2016], C-484/14, EU:C:2016:689, at ¶ 99 (emphasis added). 
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ISPs to block access to The Pirate Bay.269 The Court reached this 
conclusion on consideration of the evidence (notably, an empirical 
study from the Institute for Information Law (IViR) of the University 
of Amsterdam270), suggesting that “blocking access to file-sharing 
platforms seem relatively ineffective to reduce [the overall level of] 
unauthorized file-sharing.”271 This was due, first, to the ease of 
circumvention, and, second, – to the availability of alternative torrent 
sites. Consequently, the blocking did not achieve its purpose of 
protecting intellectual property rights and was therefore 
disproportionate with regards to the ISP’s freedom to conduct a 
business.272 This conclusion was not invalidated by the contention 
made by the claimant (Dutch collecting society BREIN in that case) 
that the blocking would not have cost anything to the ISP.273 
According to the Court, the blocking, after all, was an interference 
with the ISP’s freedom to act at its own discretion, which, in view of 
that blocking inefficacy, could not be justified by the need to protect 
intellectual property.274 All the more so, the court reasoned, that the 
ISP was not itself committing an infringement.275 
Following the CJEU judgment in Telekabel, however, the Dutch 
Supreme Court had to reject the Appeal Court’s evaluation of 
effectiveness.276 It held, with references to Telekabel, that the Court 
of Appeal had erred in its assessment of the blocking efficacy based 
on the overall effect of the measure on illegal file-sharing on the 
Internet.277 Thereby, according to the Supreme Court, the lower court 
 
 269.  Gerechtshof Den Haag [Court of Appeal of The Hague], Ziggo and 
XS4ALL v. BREIN, No. 200.105.418/01, Jan. 28, 2014. 
 270.  Another source relied upon by the Court was a report from the Netherlands 
Organisation for Applied Scientific Research. 
 271.  Joost Poort et al., Baywatch: Two Approaches to Measure the Effects of 
Blocking Access to The Pirate Bay, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 9 (2014) 
(emphasis added). 
 272.  Gerechtshof Den Haag [Court of Appeal of The Hague], Ziggo and 
XS4ALL v. BREIN, supra note 269, at ¶ 5.22. 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Id. 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Hoge Raad [Dutch Supreme Court], Ziggo and XS4ALL v. BREIN, No. 
14/02399, Nov. 13, 2015. See Karlijn van den Heuvel, To Block or not to Block? 
The Dutch Blocking Injunction Saga Continues. . ., KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG 
(Dec. 20, 2015), http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2015/12/20/to-block-or-not-to-
block-the-dutch-blocking-injunction-saga-continues/. 
 277.  Hoge Raad [Dutch Supreme Court], Ziggo and XS4ALL v. BREIN, id. at 
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had failed to recognize that even if certain measures did not lead to a 
complete cessation of all copyright infringements, they could still be 
compatible with the requirement of proportionality of Article 52(1) 
of the EU Charter by at least making unauthorized access difficult or 
seriously discouraging to achieve.278 
The “reasonable effectiveness” standard was likewise followed in 
a number of UK cases, including those issued prior to Telekabel. In 
20C Fox v. BT (from July 2011) for example, the blocking of 
Newzbin2 was found to be sufficiently effective “even if it only 
prevented access to Newzbin2 by a minority of users.”279 Insofar as 
the circumvention possibility was concerned, it was suggested that 
due to the additional technical expertise it required, coupled with the 
lower quality downloads and slower performance caused by 
circumvention, this could discourage certain users.280 As to the so-
called “‘substitutability’ of unblocked websites for the blocked 
one,”281 this was addressed in Cartier I (from October 2014) by 
stating that “the right-holder does not have to show that blocking 
access to the target website is likely to reduce the overall level of 
infringement in order to obtain relief.”282 This was for two main 
reasons. First, it was considered to be “wrong in principle” to allow 
such a defense, which would, in Justice Arnold’s contention, “not 
only undermine intellectual property rights, [but] would also be 
inimical to the rule of law” that had to treat equally online and 
offline infringements.283 An example of burglars was brought in this 
respect, to which the application of such reasoning would have 
clearly been unacceptable.284 Second, Telekabel judgment was 
referred to, insofar as it 
made it clear . . . that the measures taken by the addressee of the 
injunction must at least have the effect of making access to the protected 
 
¶ 4.4.2. 
 278.  Id. with references to CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-
314/12, EU:C:2014:192, at ¶¶ 62-62. 
 279.  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v. British Telecommunications 
Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), at ¶ 198. 
 280.  Id. at ¶¶ 194-195. 
 281.  Cartier International AG & Ors v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors 
[2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), at ¶ 176. 
 282.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 283.  Id. at ¶ 173. 
 284.  Id. 
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subject-matter difficult to achieve and of seriously discouraging internet 
users who are using the services of the addressee from accessing that 
subject-matter.285 
Justice Arnold went on to note that the CJEU “did not say that 
internet users who were using the services of other intermediaries 
must also be discouraged. Still less did the Court suggest that the 
addressee would be let off the hook if users used the services of other 
intermediaries instead.”286 At the same time, the overall-impact factor 
was not completely ruled out by Justice Arnold either, as it was also 
accepted that “blocking access to the target website is less likely to 
be proportionate if there is a large number of alternative websites 
which are likely to be equally accessible and appealing to the 
interested user than if that is not the case.”287 The approach set out in 
Cartier I has been endorsed recently in Cartier II from February 
2016, despite the fact that the former case was pending an appeal at 
the material time.288 The access providers’ contention in Cartier II 
was that there was “a very large number of websites selling 
counterfeits under the Trade Marks and so it [was] not clear that the 
closure of the Target Websites will make any difference to the scale 
of infringement of the Trade Marks.”289 Judge Hacon’s (sitting as a 
 
 285.  Id. at ¶ 174 (emphasis in the original). 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Id. at ¶ 176 (emphasis added). See also in this sense Callanan et al., supra 
note 73, at 94 observing that “the availability of alternative methods of access to 
the same content, by whatever means, can be seen as a measure for effectiveness of 
blocking in the absence of precise data. This means that where the blockade may 
well be effective, an easy alternative to publicising the same content on a different 
channel is a good indicator of the impact on the availability of the material and the 
success of the blockade in that respect.” 
 288.  Cartier International Ltd & Anor v. British Telecommunications Plc & Ors 
[2016] EWHC 339 (Ch). See Eleonora Rosati, Blocking Injunctions May be 
Granted Without Need for Claimant to Demonstrate Efficacy and Dissuasiveness, 
IPKAT (Feb. 24, 2016), http://ipkitten.blogspot.fr/2016/02/blocking-injunctions-
may-be-granted.html. As noted by Judge Hacon in Cartier II, pending any decision 
to the contrary by the Court of Appeal, he had to “assume that the whole of the 
reasoning in Cartier I [was] correct” (Cartier International Ltd & Anor v. British 
Telecommunications Plc & Ors [2016] EWHC 339 (Ch), at ¶ 48). All in all, 
Cartier I was eventually upheld in July 2016 and the appeal against it rejected. See 
Cartier International AG & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2016] 
EWCA Civ 658. 
 289.  Cartier International Ltd & Anor v. British Telecommunications Plc & Ors 
[2016] EWHC 339 (Ch), at ¶ 63. 
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High Court judge) response to this was that, “[f]or the reasons 
discussed in Cartier I . . . , although the presence of alternative 
websites may in certain circumstances have a limited bearing on 
proportionality, there is no requirement for the claimant to show that 
blocking access to the target websites in issue is likely to reduce the 
overall infringement of his trade marks.”290 
In France, considerations of reasonable effectiveness informed the 
decision of the High Court of Paris (Tribunal de Grande Instance de 
Paris), which on December 2014 ordered four of the country’s 
largest ISPs to block access to The Pirate Bay service.291 As it was 
stated in that judgment, “[w]hile it is true that any blocking measure 
can be circumvented by some part of users, it is not established, first, 
that the vast majority of Internet users who are accustomed to free 
communications and to a number of Internet services, have strong 
will to participate in global piracy on a large scale. Second, the 
requested measures target the largest number of users, who do not 
necessarily have the time and skills to discover the means that 
specialists find and retain in memory.”292 The Court then cited 
Telekabel, maintaining that impossibility to ensure complete 
enforcement of the orders was not an obstacle to blocking and did 
not have to result in the lack of recognition of the rights of IP holders 
by the courts.293 
This was also the position of the AG, who noted in his Opinion on 
Telekabel that, although “[i]t is true that potentially many users may 
be in a position to circumvent a block, . . . it by no means follows 
from this that every one of those users will actually circumvent it.”294 
The AG went on to say that “[u]sers who learn, as a result of a 
website’s being blocked, that the page is illegal may well forgo 
access to the website. To presume an intention of the part of every 
user to gain access to a website despite a block would . . . mean that 
 
 290.  Id. at ¶ 64, with further references to Cartier International AG & Ors v. 
British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch) at ¶¶ 163-176 and 
218. 
 291.  Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris [High Court of Paris], 3rd chamber, 
SCPP v. Orange, Free, SFR et Bouygues Télécom, No. 14/03236, Dec. 4, 2014, 
supra note 65. 
 292.  Id. at 14, translation from French by the authors. 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in UPC Telekabel 
Wien [2013], C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781, at ¶ 100. 
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one assumes inadmissibly that every user intends to further a breach 
of the law. Finally, . . . while it is true that quite a few users may be 
in a position to circumvent a block, far from all users would be in 
such a position.”295 Insofar as it concerned the possibility for the 
operator to provide the page in identical form under a different IP 
address and domain name, this did not, in the AG’s opinion, preclude 
the appropriateness of blocking either. According to the AG, “here 
too, users, having had their attention drawn by the blocking measure 
to the illegality of the content, may forgo visiting the page. Secondly, 
users will have to resort to search engines in order to find the page. 
With repeated blocking measures, even a search via search engines 
will be difficult.”296 
It is worth, however, noting that the “reasonable effectiveness” 
justifications for blocking were questioned by some commentators. 
Pekka Savola observes, for example, that “blocking seems to – at 
most – accomplish a slight deterrence against some non-recurring 
users, provide ‘education’ to those users, and make it seem that IPR 
holders are doing something.”297 It is also noted that the studies on 
blocking effectiveness relied upon by the national courts in the 
majority of cases were conducted or commissioned by the right-
holders and could not be verified.298 
All in all, in the absence of the evidence-based decisions of the 
European judiciary, “reasonable effectiveness” considerations 
advanced by the CJEU in Telekabel might still be called into 
question. This could be done following the logic of the Court of 
Appeal of The Hague when it refused to order the blocking based on 
the overall ineffectiveness of such measure.299 It suffices only to 
 
 295.  Id. 
 296.  Id. at ¶ 101. 
 297.  Savola, supra note 8, at ¶ 75. 
 298.  Id. at ¶ 74. See also in this sense Joe Karaganis, Rethinking Piracy, in 
MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 1, 1, supra note 145, noting that “[w]hat 
we know about media piracy usually begins, and often ends, with industry-
sponsored research.” 
 299.  Gerechtshof Den Haag [Court of Appeal of The Hague], Ziggo and 
XS4ALL v. BREIN, supra note 269. Consider also in this sense Kevin T. 
O’Sullivan, Enforcing Copyright Online: Internet Service Provider Obligations 
and the European Charter of Human Rights, 36(9) EIPR 577, 581 (2014), pointing 
that “[t]he ruling of the Court of the Hague [will] continue[] to present a policy 
challenge.” 
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mention the recent decision of the District Court of Athens (referred 
to above) that rejected the blocking as ineffective in the light of the 
various circumvention measures available to the ISPs’ customers and 
websites’ operators.300 
C. “HIGH LEVEL” OF PROTECTION AS A GOAL OF ENFORCEMENT: 
MEANS TO AN END OR ENDS TO A MEAN? 
As noted by Pekka Savola, “the goal of blocking as perceived and 
accepted by a court doing a proportionality evaluation incurs 
implications on the level of accepted proportionality.”301 In 
Telekabel, the CJEU considered that the objective of a “high level” 
of IP protection envisaged in Recital 9 InfoSoc302 justified (even the 
relatively inefficient) blocking.303 As per the Court, such goal would 
be achieved even by “making it difficult” to access infringing 
websites or by “seriously discouraging internet users” from doing 
that.304 
It should, however, be noted that the InfoSoc also pursues other 
objectives such as “a fair balance of rights and interests between . . . 
right-holders and users of protected subject-matter.”305 Furthermore, 
both Article 8(1) InfoSoc and Article 3(2) of the Enforcement 
Directive embody proportionality requirement as a necessary 
precondition for enforcement of intellectual property rights.306 This 
would mean that all fundamental rights implicated by enforcement of 
intellectual property should be considered equally, with no 
 
 300.  District Court of Athens, No. 13478/2014, Dec. 22, 2014, supra note 65; 
commented upon by Paramythiotis, Van der Sar, and Sinodinou, supra note 87. 
 301.  Savola, supra note 8, at ¶ 97. 
 302.  Recital 11 InfoSoc is even more categorical in its insistence on a 
“rigorous” system for the protection of copyright and related rights as “one of the 
main ways of ensuring that European cultural creativity and production receive the 
necessary resources and of safeguarding the independence and dignity of artistic 
creators and performers” (emphasis added). 
 303.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶¶ 31 and 62. 
 304.  Id. at ¶ 62. 
 305.  Recital 31 of the InfoSoc Directive, supra note 5. On a more general level, 
proportionality is enshrined in Art. 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union and Art. 
52(1) of the EU Charter. 
 306.  See also Art. 20 and Recital 10 of the E-Commerce Directive, supra note 
7; Recital 58 to the InfoSoc Directive, supra note 5; Recital 31 to the Enforcement 
Directive, supra note 6. 
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hierarchical differentiation on “high” and “low,” maximal and 
minimal standards of protection being drawn between them. The 
objectives and conditions of the exercise of intellectual property then 
would always be examined in the light of the general interest and 
competing interests. On the contrary, once the exclusive rights are 
given greater value than the rights of users or those of the (non-
liable) intermediaries, it would be tempting for the economic players 
to use IP rights abusively in a somewhat “maximalist” manner.307 It 
is also then easier for the courts to justify a somewhat ineffective 
protection, insofar as such protection would still achieve symbolic, 
educational, or politically-driven objectives.308 
It is worth recalling in this context that the gradual portrayal of 
exclusive rights as the “rights to forbid” or “rights to sanction” does 
not make their acceptance in the public opinion easier, especially 
when other competitive values are being somewhat underrated.309 In 
the recent discourse on the strengthening of legal means of 
protection, copyright is more frequently presented as an investment-
protection mechanism, at times acting as a scarecrow rather than a 
vehicle of cultural and social progress. Quite naturally, this has 
provoked certain counter-reactions: as copyright is perceived mainly 
as a right to exclude or punish, infringing copyright has evolved 
(predominantly among younger generations) to an act of protest, 
leading to a serious crisis of legitimacy. Even among creators, 
copyright is increasingly perceived as a hurdle in the creative 
process, as the success of the so-called “open content” models 
clearly demonstrates.310 
 
 307.  For a critical commentary of this tendency, see Alexander Peukert, 
Intellectual Property as an End in Itself?, 33(2) EIPR 67 (2011); Christophe 
Geiger, The Future of Copyright in Europe: Striking a Fair Balance Between 
Protection and Access to Information, 1 IPQ 1 (2010); Alexander Peukert, 
Intellectual Property Shall be Protected!?, supra note 256. 
 308.  Savola, supra note 8, at ¶ 91. As noted therein, “[t]he crucial question is 
which and to which degree these underlying motives of blocking can be accepted 
as legitimate. Specifically, are enforcement mechanisms (especially at 
intermediaries’ expense) available only for efficient enforcement that produces 
economically quantifiable results? Or is blocking also acceptable for educational, 
symbolic or politically motivated gestures?” See id. 
 309.  See Geiger, Copyright as an Access Right, supra note 54. 
 310.  Further on this crisis of legitimacy of intellectual property law and possible 
solutions to it, see Christophe Geiger, The Social Function of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Or How Ethics Can Influence the Shape and Use of IP Law, in 
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Despite all this, as aptly noted by Lukas Feiler, the fact that “many 
people do not see copyright law as benefiting them and their 
interests . . . is . . . not the subject of the current debate in the EU or 
the United States. Indeed, the scholarly debate as well as the public 
debate is focused on whether to enforce copyright law and fails to 
address the more fundamental question of whether substantive 
copyright law itself is actually representative of the – often 
conflicting – interests of all stakeholders.”311 
V. AS A CONCLUSION: IDENTIFYING THE 
STANDARDS FOR COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 
ONLINE AND REFLECTING ON ALTERNATIVE 
SOLUTIONS 
In conclusion, it appears that, even in the light of the guidance 
provided by European courts, national judges will continue to have a 
difficult time identifying Europe’s standards applicable in the field of 
blocking orders and their collateral effects on fundamental rights.312 
Nevertheless, existing national and European courts’ practice still 
allows identifying some criteria that can serve this delicate 
evaluation. In this article, those were summarized as follows (under 
 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES 153 (Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie ed., 2013). 
 311.  Feiler, supra note 98, at 74. See also Geiger, id. 
 312.  See in this sense European Commission, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital Single Market 
Strategy for Europe (Brussels, May 6, 2015, COM(2015) 192 final), at 7 
(admitting that “the rules applicable to activities of online intermediaries in 
relation to copyright protected works require clarification, given in particular the 
growing involvement of these intermediaries in content distribution”). Seeking 
such clarification, and with a view to analyse “whether to require intermediaries to 
exercise greater responsibility and due diligence in the way they manage their 
networks and systems” (id.), the European Commission has recently launched the 
Public Consultation on the regulatory environment for platforms, online 
intermediaries, data and cloud computing and the collaborative economy that ran 
from 24 September 2015 until 6 January 2016. For the first results of this 
consultation, see European Commission, Digital Agenda for Europe: A Europe 
2020 Initiative, First Brief Results of the Public Consultation on the Regulatory 
Environment for Platforms, Online Intermediaries, Data and Cloud Computing 
and the Collaborative Economy (Jan. 26, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/news/first-brief-results-public-consultation-regulatory-environment-
platforms-online-intermediaries. 
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the right to freedom of expression): (1) the manner in which the 
website is used (active or passive); (2) adverse effects of blocking on 
legitimate content (“collateral censorship”); (3) the general public 
interest in information; (4) availability of alternative means of 
accessing the information; and (5) accounting for the ISPs’ own 
freedom of expression interests in their capacity of the publishers of 
their customers’ expression. Insofar as the EU-specific freedom to 
conduct a business is concerned, the factors that can tilt the scales of 
proportionality evaluation encompassed: (1) the costs and 
complexity of blocking; (2) availability of reasonable alternatives 
(subsidiarity or necessity); (3) links of injunctions to liability; and (4) 
the degree of permissive private ordering. Finally, the right to 
property perspective on website blocking dictated: (1) a particularly 
wide margin of appreciation that the States would enjoy in balancing 
IP (as a human right) against other interests of equal value; (2) 
required degree of efficacy of the blocking; and (3) its intended 
purpose. 
Overall, it is notable, on the one hand, that the importance of 
proportionality analysis in enforcement and competing fundamental 
rights was confirmed. The CJEU was even ready to go as far as to 
mandate that the “user rights” could be enforced in courts,313 thereby 
being arguably more observant of freedom of expression and 
information than was the ECtHR when it first ruled on copyright 
website blocking.314 On the other hand, the CJEU (unlike its 
Advocate General315 or the ECtHR) shifted a considerable part of the 
human-rights-sensitive enforcement choices on the intermediaries, 
taking a rather delicate policy decision. As we have seen, its 
proportionality evaluation is moreover debatable and has not been 
shared by the Advocate General.316 To break it down, the Luxemburg 
 
 313.  CJEU, Judgment in UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192, at ¶ 57. 
 314.  ECtHR, Akdeniz v. Turkey (dec.) (No. 20877/10), 
CE:ECHR:2014:0311DEC002087710. 
 315.  See CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in UPC Telekabel 
Wien [2013], C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781, on the fourth question left unaddressed 
by the CJEU.  
 316.  See II.4 above. Furthermore, some commentators argued that the CJEU in 
Telekabel has largely negated the positive effect from its Sabam rulings, as 
“[s]ome forms of website-blocking require all the attributes which Sabam and 
Scarlet seemed to outlaw in their cumulation” (Husovec, CJEU Allowed Website 
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Court seems to consider that intermediaries cannot be entirely 
passive but must “do something” to prevent infringement, not 
knowing exactly what and in which cases.317 Arguably, it is not an 
easy task and it is difficult to blame the Court of Justice for trying to 
come up with some kind of solution to a very delicate question, with 
the legal tools it has at hand.318 The same can largely be said of the 
European Court of Human Rights, which is not accustomed to 
resolving issues of copyright enforcement.319 However, this should 
be understood as an invitation to the legislator to take their 
responsibility and define the rules of the game of the information 
society.320 
It can further be observed that each blocking technique, even when 
being less problematic from the perspective of one fundamental 
right, would with high probability pose serious risks to another. For 
example, IP address and DNS blocking have dangerous “collateral 
censorship” effects,321 whereas “granular” Deep Packet Inspection (a 
form of URL blocking) is also “the most technically complicated and 
expensive technique to deploy” which is moreover questionable from 
 
Blocking Injunctions with Some Reservations, supra note 55, at 634, referring to 
costs that are to be bared exclusively by providers, preventive nature of an 
injunction, its applicability to all electronic communications, indiscriminate 
application to all users, and unfixed period for which the blocking is implemented). 
 317.  See also Angelopoulos, supra note 170; Eleonora Rosati, Breaking News: 
CJEU Says that Blocking Orders are OK and Do not Have to be Specific, IPKAT 
(March 27, 2014), http://ipkitten.blogspot.fr/2014/03/breaking-news-cjeu-says-
that-blocking.html. 
 318.  If these have been correctly applied is another question that was already 
addressed above. 
 319.  The last few years have seen, however, a notable increase in the 
Strasbourg Court’s activity in this sphere. See Izyumenko, supra note 71.  
 320.  In May 2015, the European Commission presented – within the framework 
of the ongoing EU copyright reform – its Digital Single Market Strategy that 
highlights a “fit for purpose regulatory environment for platforms and 
intermediaries” among the key actions that the Commission intends to deliver by 
the end of 2016 (European Commission, Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital Single Market Strategy for 
Europe, supra note 312, at 6-8 and 11-12). In line with this purpose, the role of 
intermediaries has been addressed, in fact, in the new set of copyright reform 
proposals issued on Sept. 14, 2016. See Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council On Copyright in the Digital Single Market - 
COM(2016)593 (Brussels, Sept. 14, 2016), Recital 38. 
 321.  Ofcom, supra note 73, at 30 and 33; Callanan et al., supra note 73, at 118. 
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the perspective of the right to privacy and personal data protection.322 
All this certainly leaves the door open for further thoughts and 
clarification, all the more valuable in view of the future EU accession 
to the ECHR,323 which is likely to only strengthen the present 
tendency to test IP enforcement by fundamental rights.324 An 
experience of recent years raises, however, a more fundamental 
question of whether it is always appropriate to respond to 
technological changes by systematically strengthening the IP 
enforcement mechanisms. 
Currently, the strategy adopted by the legislators and the judiciary, 
with a strong encouragement from cultural industries, has been to 
enhance the level of deterrence mechanisms. Out of those, graduated 
response used to be the preferred solution. Its relative failure has, 
however, partially shifted the focus of online enforcement strategies 
towards targeting the Internet access providers, in particular those of 
end users.325 It must be admitted, though, that none of such strategies 
 
 322.  Ofcom, id. at 5, 40-41; Callanan et al., id. at 116. 
 323.  See Art. 6(2) TEU as amended by Art. 1(8) of the Treaty of Lisbon; and 
Art. 59(2) ECHR as amended by Art. 17 of Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR. 
Although the CJEU rejected the latest draft agreement of EU accession to the 
ECHR (Opinion 2/13 of Dec. 18, 2014, EU:C:2014:2454), this only delayed the 
accession, which remains binding on the EU. 
 324.  See (for copyright and related rights), starting with ECJ, Judgment in 
Promusicae [2008], C-275/06, EU:C:2008:54, at ¶¶ 65-68; ECJ, Order in LSG 
[2009], C-557/07, EU:C:2009:107, at ¶¶ 28-29; CJEU, Judgment in Scarlet 
Extended [2011], C-70/10, EU:C:2011:771, at ¶ 53; CJEU, Judgment in SABAM 
v. Netlog [2012], C-360/10, EU:C:2012:85, at ¶ 51; CJEU, Judgment in Bonnier 
Audio and Others [2012], C-461/10, EU:C:2012:219, at ¶ 56; CJEU, Judgment in 
UPC Telekabel Wien [2014], C-314/12, EU:C:2014:192, at ¶¶ 46-47; CJEU, 
Judgment in GS Media [2016], C-160/15, EU:C:2016:644, at ¶ 31; CJEU, 
Judgment in Mc Fadden [2016], C-484/14, EU:C:2016:689, at ¶¶ 82-83. For 
trademarks, see ECJ, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Google 
France v. Louis Vuitton [2009], C-236/08 to C-238/08, EU:C:2009:569, at ¶ 102; 
CJEU, Judgment in L’Oréal v. eBay [2011], C-324/09, EU:C:2011:474, at ¶ 143; 
CJEU, Judgment in Coty Germany [2015], C-580/13, EU:C:2015:485, at ¶ 33. 
 325.  E.g., Penelope Thornton et al., Is 2015 the Year of the Website-Blocking 
Injunction?, HOGAN LOVELLS GLOBAL MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS 
QUARTERLY 3, 3 (Spring 2015) (“[R]ights holders, dissatisfied with some of the 
existing national graduated response regimes, are increasingly turning to the 
powerful and effective tool of website-blocking injunctions”); Petteri Günther, The 
Plan for a Digital Single Market in Europe and Reforming EU Copyright Rules to 
Develop a Market-Oriented Approach to Reduce Infringement on the Internet, 
38(1) EIPR 43, 49 (2016) (“In practice, injunctions against ISPs in Europe to block 
access to allegedly infringing content are the favoured approach today, and the 
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did so far achieve the expected results,326 thus clearly raising the 
question of their appropriateness and calling for an examination of 
alternative solutions. 
Some of these alternatives to tougher copyright enforcement in the 
online world still need to be elaborated. If it seems fair that all actors 
involved in the production, distribution and consumption of culture 
 
legal situation does not appear to lack clarity in this respect.”). See also Eleonora 
Rosati, 2015: The Year of Blocking Injunctions? [Editorial], 10(3) JIPLP 147 
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noting at 49 that “the results of blocking orders seem unclear with respect to 
reducing the actual levels of online piracy while still maintaining a balance 
between conflicting rights. Their effect has been deemed questionable, for instance 
because the data on BitTorrent traffic levels in connection with adopted website 
blocking measures have been inconclusive, and blocking orders are also 
problematic concerning satisfying the requirement of proportionality of the 
enforcement measures.” Joe Karaganis also argues on this line:  
“Despite the stream of lawsuits and site closures, we see no evidence – and indeed 
very few claims – that these efforts have had any measurable impact on online piracy. 
The costs and technical requirements of running a torrent tracker or indexing site are 
modest, and new sites have quickly emerged to replace old ones. P2P continues to 
account for a high percentage of total bandwidth utilization in most parts of the world, 
and infringing files represent, by most accounts, a very high percentage of P2P 
content.”  
Karaganis, supra note 298, at 30. 
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participate in the financing of such a crucial sector for society,327 
other systems of collection and redistribution of the value of creative 
products online could be imagined, which would be less intrusive for 
equally important fundamental rights and values. Some in fact have 
been explored, with promising results.328 One of them involves the 
legalization of certain practices through a system of equitable 
remuneration as it was often proposed in the context of non-
commercial file-sharing.329 This system, sometimes called the 
“global license,”330 subjects downloading to a sort of statutory license 
by analogy with the private copy exception, while the 
communication of the file (in other words the “upload”) is subject to 
mandatory collective management,331 on the model of what has been 
 
 327.  And this of course includes intermediaries as well, which conduct 
profitable businesses. 
 328.  See, for example, a large-scale empirical study of Alternative 
Compensation Systems conducted through 2012 to 2015 by a multidisciplinary 
research group at the Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of 
Amsterdam: Balázs Bodó et al., Copyright in an Age of Access: Alternatives to 
Copyright Enforcement (2015), http://ivir.nl/onderzoek/acs?lang=en. 
 329.  See in particular João Pedro Quintais, Alternative Compensation Models 
for Large-Scale Non-Commercial Online Uses, Paper presented at ALAI 
International Congress – 50 Years of the German Copyright Act: Remuneration for 
the Use of Works – Exclusivity vs. Other Approaches, Bonn, June 18–20, 2015 
(ALAI Conference Proceedings). See also P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Lecture within the 
framework of the CEIPI conferences on fundamental questions of intellectual 
property: Copyright Piracy on the Internet: Litigate, Legalize, Licence or Laissez-
faire? (Feb. 22, 2010, Strasbourg), suggesting that all the consequences should be 
drawn from the failure of the repressive solutions, and envisaging a certain number 
of legal options to solve the question of downloading from the Internet. See also 
the proposals made by Philippe Aigrain, INTERNET ET CREATION, COMMENT 
RECONNAITRE LES ECHANGES SUR INTERNET EN FINANÇANT LA CREATION? (2008). 
 330.  See on the “global licence” in particular Lionel Thoumyre, La licence 
globale optionnelle: un pare-feu contre les bugs de la répression, (15) RLDI 80 
(2006). Draft laws aimed at implementing a “global licence” have been proposed 
in France. Thus, during the debates on the DADVSI Bill in December 2005, the 
French Parliament adopted an amendment according to which a download from an 
online communications service by a private individual for private use 
(downloading a file) was lawful, under the condition that fair compensation is 
awarded. Subsequently, however, the Parliament revised this amendment. Also in 
Belgium the legislative proposals introducing a “global licence” have been 
advanced: see on this question, Caroline Colin & Séverine Dusollier, Les 
perspectives de légitimation des échanges des œuvres sur les réseaux peer-to-peer 
en Belgique, in LE TÉLÉCHARGEMENT D’ŒUVRES SUR INTERNET, supra note 46.  
 331.  See on this, Carine Bernault & Audrey Lebois (under the supervision of 
André Lucas), PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING AND LITERARY AND ARTISTIC 
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set up for other types of mass-use that are difficult to control 
individually.332 
More generally, it would seem vital to rethink copyright in the 
21st-century in order to identify solutions that would benefit all 
players in the creative process equitably,333 and specifically the 
author who is often the great forgotten of the copyright system.334 As 
it was aptly noted by Neelie Kroes in her capacity as the Vice-
President of the European Commission responsible for the Digital 
Agenda: 
Today’s world is a very different one to that of the 2001 EU Copyright 
Directive. With new expectations for consumers, new opportunities for 
creators, new tools from social media to big data. Every day citizens . . . 
across the EU break the law just to do something commonplace. And who 
can blame them when those laws are so ill-adapted. . . . Technology 
moves faster than the law can, particularly in the EU. Today, the EU  
 
 
copyright framework is fragmented, inflexible, and often irrelevant. It 
 
PROPERTY: A FEASIBILITY STUDY REGARDING A SYSTEM OF COMPENSATION FOR 
THE EXCHANGE OF WORKS VIA THE INTERNET (Institute for Research on Private 
Law, University of Nantes, June 2005). 
 332.  For a detailed discussion, see Geiger, supra note 326. 
 333.  See in this sense Francis Gurry, Developments in the International 
Intellectual Property System, in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM IN A TIME 
OF CHANGE: EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 61 (Christophe Geiger 
ed., 2016), underlining that the role of copyright is “finding a balance between all 
the competing interests that surround the act of cultural creation. On the one hand, 
there are the interests of the creators, who derive their economic existence through 
the restriction on access that copyright entails. On the other hand, there are the 
interests of society and the general public. Access is the reason for which we are 
interested in cultural production.” 
 334.  A large majority of creators, in the absence of an effective author’s 
contract law, frequently participate only insufficiently in the exploitation of their 
works. For a discussion of this aspect of the issue, see Christophe Geiger, 
Promoting Creativity Through Copyright Limitations: Reflections on the Concept 
of Exclusivity in Copyright Law, 12(3) VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515 (2010); Reto 
M. Hilty, Verbotsrecht vs. Vergütungsanspruch: Suche nach Konsequenzen der 
tripolaren Interessenlage im Urheberrecht, in Perspektiven des Geistigen 
Eigentums und Wettbewerbsrechts, Festschrift für Gerhard Schricker zum 70. 
Geburtstag 325 (Ansgar Ohly et al. eds., 2005); Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for 
Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383 (2014). 
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should be a stimulant to openness, innovation and creativity, not a tool 
for . . . obstruction, limitation and control. . . . Things need to change in 
Europe and they need to change right now.335 
 
 
 335.  Kroes, supra note 1. The current Commissioner for the Digital Economy 
and Society, Günther H. Oettinger, followed up on this, when stating recently: 
“[W]e want a copyright environment that is stimulating, fair, rewards investment 
in creativity and makes it easier for Europeans to access and use content legally. 
Our ongoing work on the role of platforms and online intermediaries will also help 
to translate our plan into concrete proposals.” European Commission Press release, 
Commission Takes First Steps to Broaden Access to Online Content and Outlines 
its Vision to Modernise EU Copyright Rules (Brussels, Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6261_en.htm.  
